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From Versailles to Rwanda in
Seventy-Five Years:
The Need to Establish a Permanent

International Criminal Court
M. Cherif Bassiouni*

INTRODUCTION
The history and record of international criminal investigation and
adjudication bodies, from the Treaty of Versailles to the International
Criminal Court for Rwanda, clearly demonstrate the need to establish
a permanent international criminal court. In the absence of such a
court, not only have many atrocities gone unpunished, but every one
of the ad hoc tribunals and investigations that has been created has
suffered from the competing interests of politics or the influence of a
changed geopolitical situation. As the history of the United Nations'
efforts to establish a permanent international criminal court and a code
of crimes evince, this task is controversial and complex. Nevertheless,
the lessons of the past seventy-five years dictate its fundamental importance.
Between 1919 and 1994 there were five ad hoc international investigation commissions, four ad hoc international criminal tribunals, and
three internationally mandated or authorized national prosecutions
arising out of World War I and World War II. These processes were
established by different legal means with varying mandates, many of
them producing results contrary to those originally contemplated.
The investigations and prosecutions were established to appease
public demand for a response to the tragic events and shocking conduct
during armed conflicts. Despite public pressure demanding justice,
* Copyright 0 1997 M. Cherif Bassiouni.
Professor of Law, President, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University;
President, International Association of Penal Law; President, International Institute of Higher
Studies in Criminal Sciences; Vice-Chairman, United Nations Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court; Former Chairman, Commission of Experts
Established by the Security Council to Investigate Violations of International Humanitarian Law
in the Former Yugoslavia. The views expressed herein are solely the author's.
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investigative and adjudicating bodies were established for only a few
international conflicts. Domestic conflicts, no matter how brutal, drew
even less attention from the world's major powers, whose political will
has been imperative to the establishment of such bodies. The Rwanda
Tribunal, the only tribunal authorized to prosecute genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes committed during a non-international armed conflict, has had little success to date.
Even when tribunals and investigative commissions were established, their professed goal-the pursuit of justice by independent,
effective and fair methods and procedures-was seldom upheld. Instead, the establishment and administration of these bodies were subordinated to realpolitik goals. They were, in varying degrees, controlled or influenced by political considerations, at times exercised overtly
and, at other times, through more subtle techniques. Political decisions
often led to the logistical, personnel, and legal difficulties that contributed to the malfunctioning of the tribunals. Bureaucratic and financial
methods were used to direct, curtail, check, and ultimately terminate
these bodies for political reasons. Politicians often intentionally allowed
time to pass so that public interest in justice waned, public pressure
eroded, and they were no longer compelled to ensure the success of the
bodies.
A telling example of the interplay between law and politics characteristic of these bodies is the allocation of responsibility during the
different trial stages. Frequently, there was total separation between
the establishment of the bodies and their administration. Similarly, the
investigation stage was separated from the adjudication, and in each
case, without exception, the judicial bodies that pronounced sentences
were terminated immediately after the adjudication. The sentence
execution stage, involving pardons and releases before the full execution of sentences, was typically the responsibility of a political administrator whose decisions were not necessarily motivated by justice
concerns.
This compartmentalization contributes to the over-all difficulty of
assessing the nature, intent, and impact of the political decisions which
created, administered, and ended these bodies. Those who were present
at one stage were rarely present at subsequent ones. Furthermore,
institutional records documenting the various stages seldom reflect the
activity occurring behind the political curtain. Persons inside the political process are reluctant to betray those who appointed them to
their positions by divulging the political considerations that influence
the operation of the bodies. The true history of these institutions is
therefore often incomplete.
If the lessons of the past are to instruct the course of the future,
then the creation of a permanent system of international criminal
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justice with a continuous institutional memory is imperative. But such
a system must be independent, fair and effective, in order to avoid the
pitfalls experienced in the past. Above all, it must be safeguarded from
the vagaries of realpolitik. Compromise is the art of politics, not of
justice.
These points will be illustrated through an examination of the
previous ad hoc investigative commissions and international criminal
tribunals. This Article then reviews the United Nations' efforts to
establish an international criminal court and to codify certain international crimes.
I. AD HOC INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATIVE
COMMISSIONS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS SINCE 1919
There have been five international investigative commissions,1 four
ad hoc international tribunals, 2 and three internationally mandated
prosecutions 3 since 1919. Because all these processes were either instil.
1. The 1919 Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on
Enforcement of Penalties (1919 Commission);
2. The 1943 United Nations War Crimes Commission (1943 UNWCC);
3. The 1946 Far Eastern Commission (FEC);
4. The 1992 Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) to Investigate War Crimes and other Violations of International
Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia (1992 Yugoslavia Commission of Experts);
and
5. The 1994 Independent Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 935 (1994) to Investigate Grave Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of Rwanda (1994 Rwanda Commission of Experts).
A commission called The Commission on the Truth was established under the peace agreements between the government of EL Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberaci6n
Nacional (FMLN). This Commission was, therefore, established pursuant to an agreement between a government and an internal insurgency movement. Nevertheless, the three Commission
members were designated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It is unclear whether
this Commission can be deemed an international commission as in the case of the others
mentioned herein. For the report of the Commission see Letter dated 29 March 1993 from the
Sccretary-Generaladdressedto the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S125500 (1993).
2.
1. The 1945 International Military Tribunal to Prosecute the Major War Criminals of
the European Theater (IMT);
2. The 1946 International Military Tribunal to Prosecute the Major War Criminals of
the Far East (IMTFE);
3. The 1993 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY); and
4. The 1994 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
3.
1. 1921-1923 Prosecutions by the German Supreme Court Pursuant to Allied Requests
Based on the Treaty of Versailles (Leipzig Trials);
2. 1946-195 5 Prosecutions by the Four Major Allies in the European Theater Pursuant
to Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL 10); and
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tutionally linked or related by reason to the conflict which gave rise
to their establishment, they are best understood through an historical
analysis.

A. The 1919 Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War
and on Enforcement of Penalties
The first international investigative commission was established at
the end of World War I by the victorious Allies when the Allied and
Associated Powers convened the 1919 Preliminary Peace Conference
in Paris. 4 At the Conference, the representatives of the Allies negotiated Germany's surrender and a peace treaty, whose terms they dictated. Much of the debate among the Allies addressed issues concerning the prosecution of Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm II, German war
criminals, and Turkish officials for "crimes against the laws of humanity."5 Ultimately, after much compromise, the Allied representatives
agreed on the terms of the Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and
Associated Powers and Germany, concluded at Versailles on 28 June
1919.6 Article 227 of the Treaty provided for the creation of an ad hoc
international criminal tribunal to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm II for
3. 1946-1951 Military Prosecutions by Allied Powers in the Far East Pursuant to
Directives of the FEC.
4. Prior to the 1919 Commission, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace established
a nongovernmental commission of international personalities to investigate alleged atrocities
committed against civilians and prisoners of war during the First Balkan War of 1912 and the
Second Balkan War of 1913. CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE OTHER

WARS: A 1913 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INQUIRY IN RETROSPECT WITH A NEW
INTRODUCTION AND REFLECTIONS ON THE PRESENT CONFLICT BY GEORGE R KENNAN (1993)
BALKAN

[hereinafter BALKAN WARS]. The seven members appointed to the Commission by the Carnegie
Endowment were from the following countries: Austria-Hungary (1), Britain (1), France (2),
Germany (1), Russia (1), and the United States (1). At the onset of the Second Balkan War, in
order to give the western world a "clear and reliable picture of what was going on in the affected
region," the Commission investigated the conflict and the conduct of individuals. Id. at 6. Several
fact-finding missions were conducted by the Balkan Commission and subsequently a substantial
report based on the Commission's findings was published. The Balkan Commission released its
report in July 1914. In August, World War I began and the report became relevant to history.
The atrocities reported by the Balkan Commission bear an uncanny resemblance to those that
were reported by the 1992 Yugoslavia Commission of Experts. Compare, for an assessment of the
similarities, the CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CAUSES AND CONDUCT OF THE BALKAN WARS
(1914), reprintedin BALKAN WARS, ss pra, to the FinalReport of the Commission of Experts Eitablishcd
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc.
S/1994/674 (1994) [hereinafter Final Report]; Annexes to the Final Report, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2 (1994) [hereinafter Annexes].
5. For information on the Armenian genocide, see generally VAHAKN N. DADRIAN, THE
HISTORY OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE (1995); Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of
National andInternationalLaw: The World War I Armenian Case and its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 221 (1989); ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, ARMENIAN ATROCITIES (1915).
6. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, concluded at
Versailles, June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43 [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles].
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initiating the war.7 The Treaty also provided in Articles 228 and 229
for the prosecution of German military personnel accused of violating
the laws and customs of war before Allied Military Tribunals or before
the Military Courts of any of the Allies.8
The official inter-governmental Commission established by the Preliminary Peace Conference was called the Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of Penalties. 9 Its
mandate was to investigate and report on the responsibility of those
who had initiated the war and those who had violated the laws and
customs of war in order to prosecute them. 10 The Commission held
closed meetings for two months and conducted intensive investigations. 1 This work was supposed to culminate in the charging of named
individuals for specific war crimes. Based on subsequent developments
in the administration of the Commission's mandate, however, it is
reasonable to question whether the Allies' intentions were to pursue
justice or whether they only intended to use symbols of justice to
achieve political ends.

7. Id. art. 227, at 136.

8. Article 228 states:
The German Government recognizes the right of the Allied and Associated Powers
to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation
of the laws and customs of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to
punishments laid down by law. This provision will apply notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or in the territory of her allies.
The German Government shall hand over to the Allied and Associated Powers, or
to such one of them as shall so request, all persons accused of having committed an
act in violation of the laws and customs of war, who are specified either by name or
by the rank, office, or employment which they held under the German authorities.
Article 229 states:
Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of one of the Allied and
Associated Powers will be brought before the military tribunals of that Power.
Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of more than one of the Allied
and Associated Powers will be brought before military tribunals composed of members
of the military tribunals of the Powers concerned.
In every case the accused will be entitled to name his own counsel.
Id., arts. 228 and 229, at 137.
9. The Commission was comprised of two members from each of the five Great Powers: the
United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan. The additional states
composing the Allied and Associated Powers were Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, CzechoSlovakia, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama,
Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Siam, and Uruguay. CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE TREATiFs OF PEAE 1919-1923 3 (1924). The
additional states, having a special interest in the matter, met and decided that Belgium, Greece,

Poland, Romania, and Serbia should each name a representative to the Commission as well.
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties,
Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, March 29, 1919, 14 Am. J. INT'L L. 95, 96
(1920) [hereinafter 1919 CoMaIssIoN REPORT].
10. 1919 CommissioN REPORT, supra note 9, at 95.
11. JAMES F. WILus, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE PoLITIcs AND DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 68 (1982).
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The Commission completed its report in. 1920 and submitted a list
of 895 alleged war criminals, 12 who were to be tried by the Allied
tribunal. The Commission also sought to charge Turkish officials and
other individuals for "crimes against the laws of humanity" 13 based on
the so-called Martens Clause contained in the Preamble of the 1907
Hague Convention. 14 That clause states:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been
issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to
declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted
by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under
the protection and the rule of,the principles of the law of nations, as
they resultfrom the usages established among civilized peoples, from
the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.15
In reliance upon the Martens Clause, the Convention contained only
a portion of the laws of humanity and other general principles of law
which should be applicable to armed conflicts. That partial codification
did not reject the rest of the potentially applicable positive international law, but merely deferred codification until another time when
12. Sources conflict as to the number of alleged war criminals listed for prosecution. Se
TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 17 (1992) (stating that the Allies
presented a list of 854 individuals, including political and military figures); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CEIINAL LAW 200 (1992) [hereinafter
CRIMES AGAINST HumANiTY] (stating that the Allies submitted a list of 895 named war
criminals); Remigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes: Histy and Definition, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL. LAW 29, 36 (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 3 vols., 1987) [hereinafter ICL] (stating that 901 names
appeared on the list).
13. CRIMES AGAINST HumANITY, supra note 12, at 170. See generally EUGNE ARONEANU, LE
CRIME CONTRE i:HumAeNiT- (1961); PIETER DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE (2 vols. 1959); Egon
Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. YB. INTL L. 178 (1946).
14. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on land, Oct. 18, 1907, preamble,
36 Star. 2277, 2779-80, 1 Bevans 631, 632 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention]. See also
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEAC13
CONFERENCES: TRANSLATION OF OFFICIAL TEXTS-THE CONFERENCE OF 1899 548 (1920). For
a commentary on the Martens clause, see Paolo Benvenuti, La Clausola ilartens c la Tradizione

Classicadel DirittoNauralenela Codificazionedel Dirittodei Conflutti Armati, ScRrrI DEGLI ALLIEvI
IN MEMORIA Di GIuSEPPE BARILE 173 (1993). Similar renditions of the Martens Clause, named
after Fyodor Martens, the Russian diplomat and jurist who drafted the clause, appear in each of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949,
art. 63(4), 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3152, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 68; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 62(4), 6 U.S.T. 3217, 3254, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 120; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 158(4), 6 U.S.T. 3516,
3622, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 392; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 142(4), 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3424, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 242; Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) adopted June 8, 1977, referenced in 16 I.LM. 1391.
15. 1907 Hague Convertion, supra note 14, preamble (emphasis added).
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greater political consensus could be obtained. The Commission felt
justified in relying upon the Martens Clause to develop the charge of
"crimes against the laws of humanity." The United States and Japan,
however, specifically opposed it on the grounds that the Commission's
mandate was to investigate violations of the laws and16customs of war
and not the uncodified, so-called "laws of humanity.'
Although charges were to be brought against Turkish officials for
the large-scale killing of Armenians in Turkey in 1915, no action was
ever taken. 17 These charges were based on the authority of the Treaty
of S~vres of 1920 between the Allies and Turkey, 18 which provided for
Turkey's surrender of accused persons to be tried presumably for "crimes
against the laws of humanity." But the Treaty of S~vres was not ratified
and its provisions were never implemented. Instead, it was replaced in
1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne, 19 which did not contain any provisions
on prosecutions, but rather had an unpublicized annex granting Turk20
ish officials amnesty.
Because the Allies were concerned about the stability of Turkey and
eager not to alienate the new Turkish ruling elite which was partial to
the western powers, Turkish officials were given impunity for war
crimes. At that time, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 which toppled
the Tsarist regime was causing concern in England and France. Turkey,
on the border of the new communist regime, and the controlling power
over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, through which the Russian
Navy would have to transit to reach the Mediterranean from the Black
Sea, was needed in the "western camp." Political concerns, thus, prevailed over the pursuit of justice.

16. See Memorandum of Reservations Presented by the Representatives of the United States to the Report
of the Commission on Responsibilities, Annex II, Apr. 4, 1919, reprinted in 14 Am.J. INT'L L 127,
144-51 (1920) [hereinafter Annex III; Reservations by the Japanese Delegation, Annex III, Apr. 4,
1919, reprintedin 14 AM. J. IN'L L 151 (1920).
17. See Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I
Armenian Case and its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, supra note 5, at 223. The Turkish Govern-

ment and Turkish writers have consistently denied that such a massacre ever took place. Instead,
they argue that there were ethnic confrontations between Armenians and other Turks which
resulted in casualties on both sides. See Vahakn N. Dadrian, Documentation of the Armenian Genocide
in Turkisb Sources, in 2 GENOCIDE: A CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHIC REviEw 86 (Israel W. Charney

ed., 1991).
18. Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey, Aug. 10, 1920 (Treaty of SRvres),
reprinted in 15 Am. J. INT'L L. 179 (Supp. 1921).
19. Treaty with Turkey and Other Instruments, July 24, 1923 (Treaty of Lausanne), reprinted
in 18 Ame. J. INT'L L. 1 (Supp. 1924).
20. Id. See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Comefor an International Criminal Court, 1
IND. INT'L & COMP. L.REv. 1, 2-4 (1991).
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B. The Allies' Failureto Establish Prosecutions Pursuantto the Treaty of
Versailles
The Treaty of Versailles did not link the 1919 Commission to
eventual prosecutions recognized under its Articles 228 and 229, resulting in an institutional vacuum between the investigation and prosecution stage. Therefore, if the outcome of investigating was no longer
politically useful, it could be reduced to a report that was easy to
ignore and ultimately forget. If, however, the investigation outcome
became politically useful, it could be used for eventual prosecutions.
The two major provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, Articles 227
and 228, were not implemented. Regarding prosecution of the Kaiser
under Article 227, the Kaiser sought refuge in the Netherlands, and
through diplomatic channels the Allies discussed the possibility of an
eventual request for the Kaiser's surrender. The response from the
Netherlands, whose sitting monarch was the Kaiser's cousin, was not
positive. As a result, the Allies did not formally request his extradition,
and there was no formal judicial or administrative process in which
the Kaiser's extradition was denied. 21 The Allies blamed the Netherlands, and some saw this as a way to avoid establishing a tribunal
pursuant to Article 227. The Allies were not ready to create the
precedent of prosecuting a Head of State for a new international crime.
Indeed, this was evident in the choice of words used by the Allies in
drafting Article 227, authored primarily by representatives of Great
Britain:
The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William
II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme
offence against internationalmorality and the sanctity of treaties.
21. Through diplomatic channels, the Allies requested that the Netherlands "make the Kaiser
available for trial," but the Netherlands reportedly denied that request, allegedly speculating that
it was made as a political formality and that the Allies would not exert effort to secure his
surrender. TLFoRD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 16 (1992). The legal
grounds for denying the request were that the "offense charged against the Kaiser was unknown
to Dutch law, was nor mentioned in any treaties to which Holland was a party, and appeared to
be of a political rather than a criminal character." Id See also Quincy Wright, Ths Logality of the
Kaiser, 13 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 121 (1919). The Netherlands discouraged formal extradition
requests because extradition treaties applied only to cases in which a criminal act occurred. The
Netherlands viewed the charge against the Kaiser as a "political offence" because a Head of State's
decision to go to war is within the prerogative of national sovereignty and, therefore, not a crime
under Dutch Law. See James W. Garner, Punishment of Offenders Against the Laws and Cstoms of
War, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 70, 91 (1920); WiLLis, supra note 11, at 66. For a discussion of the
political offense exception to extradition, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE Ch. VIII (3d ed. 1996); CHRISTINE VAN DEN
WINGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION: THE DELICATE PROBLEM
OF BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER

(1980).
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A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused,
thereby assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of
defence ....
In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest
motives of international policy, with a view to vindicating the
solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of international morality ....
The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to
the Government of the Netherlands for the surrender to them
22
of the ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on trial.
The text does not refer to a known international crime, but characterizes the purported crime of aggression as a "political" crime. Thus,
the Dutch Government had a valid legal basis to reject the Allies'
attempt to secure the surrender of the Kaiser for trial if such a request
was to be formally presented. It was not. Article 227, quite possibly,
was intended to fail. It offered a concession to the European masses,
who saw the Kaiser as an ogre of war, and to the French and Belgian
Governments, who wanted to humiliate Germany for initiating the
war.
As for the prosecutions intended by Article 228, by 1921, the zest
of the Allies to set up joint or even separate military tribunals had
waned, and new developments in Europe required that Germany not
be further humiliated. In order to avoid jeopardizing the stability of
the already vulnerable Weimar Republic, 23 the Allies asked Germany
to prosecute a limited number of war criminals before the Reichsgericht
(the Supreme Court of Germany) in Leipzig instead of establishing an
Allied Tribunal, as provided for in Article 228.24
C. The Leipzig Trials
In response to the Allied request to undertake prosecutions, Germany, which had previously passed a national law to implement provisions of Articles 228 and 229, passed new legislation to assume
jurisdiction under its national laws in order to prosecute accused
offenders before its Supreme Court, sitting at Leipzig. Under German
22. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 6, art. 227, at 136 (emphasis added).
23. According to the leader of the British Mission at the Leipzig Trials, the post-war German
Government convinced the Supreme Council that an attempt to arrest many of those named on
the Allies' list of war criminals would bring down the government. CLiAUD MULLINS, THE
LEIPZIG TRIALs: AN AccouNT OF THE WAR CIMNALs'
MENTAL1TY 9 (1921).

TRILS AND A STUDY OF GERiAN

24. The Allies, however, maintained that even though they allowed the Germans to conduct
the trials before a German court, they reserved the right to set aside the German judgments and
carry out the provisions of Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles. That did not occur, however.
Id. at 26. See also WiLus, supra note 11, at 142.
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law, the Procurator General of the Supreme Court had the right to
decide which cases would be brought to trial. The Allies, therefore,
had to submit their cases, including evidence, to the Procurator General who had prosecutorial discretion. From the original list of 895
prepared by the 1919 Commission, the Allies submitted only forty-five
names for prosecution. 25 Despite the 1919 Commission's extensive
report and the Allies' supplemental information conveyed to the German Procurator General, only twelve military officers were ultimately
prosecuted before the Reichsgericht.26 There were no other national or
Allied proceedings against any of those accused of war crimes by the
1919 Commission or any of the cases rejected for prosecution by the
German Procurator General.
Although the armistice between Germany and the Allies was signed
on November 11, 1919, the trials at Leipzig did not begin until May
23, 1921.27 By 1923, the Allies' political will to pursue justice by
prosecuting and punishing those who had violated international humanitarian law all but dissolved. International public interest dissipated, and domestic political concerns in the Allied countries overshadowed any remaining concerns that some academics, intellectuals, and
public-spirited citizens still had in Belgium, France, and Great Britain.
By then, the United States was in the throes of isolationism, with its
rejection of President Woodrow Wilson's internationalist views, evidenced by Congress' refusal to have the United States become part of
the League of Nations.
The Leipzig trials exemplified the sacrifice of justice on the altars of
international and domestic politics of the Allies. 28 The Treaty commitment to try and punish offenders if Germany failed to do so was never
carried out. The political leaders of the major powers of that time were
more concerned with ensuring the future peace of Europe than pursu-

25. ICL, supra note 12, at 36.
26. Those convicted received sentences ranging from six months to four years, but not all were
required to serve these lenient terms. Id. During these proceedings, the accused were cheered by
crowds that attended the trials and gathered outside the courtrooms. In the eyes of the public,
the accused were considered national heroes and became martyrs of foreign oppression. Thus,
what was intended to be a deterrent to future violations of international humanitarian law, gave
rise to nationalistic fervor and a sense of indignation which became a unifying force in Germany
against the Allies. See id. at 36-37. The National-Socialist Party (the Nazi Party) seized power
in 1932, only nine years after the Leipzig trials.
The German Procurator General, however, did bring his own cases against German soldiers
for crimes committed during the war. For example, three German soldiers were convicted of
robbing a Belgian innkeeper and were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from two to
five years. WILLIS, supra note 11, at 130. The result showed that the German court was willing
to impose harsher sentences on those accused by the German authorities than on those accused
by the Allies. Id.
27. CRIMFS AGAINST Huz.&NriT, 5ipra note 12, at 202.
28. Id.
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ing justice. 29 Indeed, it was a common belief that World War I was
"the war to end all wars," and that the League of Nations would usher
a new world order that would prevent future wars. The Allies, however,
missed the opportunity to establish an international system of justice
that would have functioned independently of political considerations
to ensure uncompromised justice.
The weak processes of international criminal justice following World
War I not only failed to deter the military leaders who initiated World
War II, but enhanced their cynicism. During a 1939 speech, Hitler
reportedly stated in connection with his plans to "cleanse" (his early
euphemism for exterminate) Jews, Gypsies, and others from the Third
Reich: "Who after all is today speaking about the destruction of the
Armenians?" 30 Hitler's words reflect a view still common today that
31
the rule of might overshadows the rule of law.
D. The 1943 United Nations War Crimes Commission
The atrocities of World War II compelled the need for international
prosecutions after the Allied victory. In 1942, the Allied Powers signed
an agreement at the Palace of St. James, 32 establishing the United
Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC). 33 The Declaration of St.
James was the first step leading to the establishment of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg. Despite high expectations for the UNWCC, for all practical purposes this inter-governmental, treaty-created, investigative body was subordinated to political
29. TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 15.
30. WILnIs, supra note 11, at 173 (quoting Adolf Hitler, Speech to the Chief Commanders
and Commanding Generals on the Obersalzburg (Aug. 22, 1939) in 7 BITISH DOCUMENTS ON
FOREIGN POLICY, 1919-1939, THIRD SERIES, at 258 (E.L. Woodward et al. eds., 1949-55));
Winfried Baumgart, Ziir Ansprache Hitlers vorden Fiihren der Wehrmacht am 22 August 1939; Eine
Qudlenkritische Untersuchung, ViERTELJAHRSHEFrE FOR ZEITGESCHICHTE, Apr. 1968, 120. But see
Ttdrkkaya Ata6v, Hitler and the "Armenian Question" (Monograph, Ankara University, 1992).
31. Who now remembers Biafra, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Uganda, Burundi, Liberia, and other
genocides and mass murder? See, e.g., GuY RICHADM ET AL., L'HISTOIRE INHUMAINE: MASSACRES
ET G9NOCIDFS DES ORIGINES X NOS JOURS (1992); Matthew Lippman, The Drafting of the1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genodde, 3 B. U. INT'L L.J. 1 (1985).
More recently one author put the toll of mass killings at over 160 million victims. See R.J.
KAMIPUCHEA: DECADE OF THE GENOCIDE
RU1 aIEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT (1994). See also
(Kimmo Kljunen ed., 1984); REPORT OF THE CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE PROJECT (1984); LEO
KUPER, GENOCIDE (1981); JOHN STRENLAW, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE NIGERIAN
CIVIL WAR 1967-1970 (1977).
32. The Inter-Allied Declaration, Jan. 13, 1942, reprinted in PUNISHMENT FOR WAR CRIMES:
THE INTER-ALLIED DECLARATION SIGNED AT ST. JAMES' PALACE, LONDON, ON 13 JANUARY
1942, AND RELATIVE DOCUMENTS (Inter-Allied Information Committee, London, undated). See
also UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR
CRIMES COMIuSSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 89-92 (1948) [hereinafter
HISTORY OF THE UNWCC].
33. Even though this Commission's name was preceded by "United Nations," it was unrelated
to the world body founded in San Francisco in 1945.
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considerations and ultimately relegated to a role far inferior to that
which was expected by the Allies.
The UNWCC was comprised of representatives from seventeen nations, most of which were governments in exile possessing only limited
powers. 34 Given the uncertain future of these exiled governments, the
UNWCC had little political influence and support. 35 Under the aegis
of the Allied Powers, the UNWCC was to investigate and obtain
evidence of war crimes. 36 Despite this mandate, the Allied Powers did
not provide the UNWCC with an investigatory staff, adequate support
staff, or sufficient funds to conduct its work. In fact, within a few
months of its creation, the first Chairman of the UNWCC, Sir Cecil
Hurst, announced that the Commission would be unable to fulfill its
mandate. 37 The UNWCC relied on governments to submit reports,
but by the end of 1942 it had only received seventy cases which
contained incomplete or insubstantial information. Even after the chairman's exhortations to Allied Governments, there were very few new
38
government submissions.
Only after the Allies liberated German-occupied territories did they
realize the extent of the atrocities committed. Thereafter, British and U.S.
forces began to develop a list of suspected war criminals in order to
separate them from other liberated prisoners. 39 At that point, the British
Government began to press the UNWCC to complete its work.4°
Despite the initial lack of cooperation from and among the various
governments, the UNWCC was able to achieve remarkable results in
amassing 8,178 "dossiers" on alleged war criminals and serving as a
clearinghouse of information among governments. 41 Although the UNWCC
collected information pertaining to allegations of war crimes, it was
not institutionally linked to the IMT or to the Subsequent Proceedings
by the Allied occupation forces in Germany pursuant to Allied Control
12
Council Law No. 10, each of which had its own investigative teams,'

34. ANN TISA & JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIL. 22 (1984) [hereinafter TJSA & TJSA]
35. TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 26-27.
36. The UNWCC was limited to investigating war crimes only. Thus, even though some of
its members desired to investigate the allegations of atrocities committed against the Jews, they
could not because such acts constituted "crimes against humanity" and not war crimes. TUSA &
TUSA, supra note 34, at 22.
37. HISTORY OF THE UNWCC, supra note 32; TUSA & TUSA, supra note 34, at 22.
38. ToSA & TWA, supra note 34, at 23.
39. Id. at 29.

40. Id.
41. The UNWCC examined the 8,178 "dossiers" submitted by governments, and if satisfied
with the contents, recommended prosecution of the individual. The "dossiers" amounted to
24,453 accused, 9520 suspects, and 2556 material witnesses. HisTORY OF THE UNWCC, supra
note 32, at 508-09.
42. Control Council Law No. 10 and proceedings under it are discussed below at text
accompanying notes 79-82.
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nor was it linked to the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East (IMTFE) and the Allied Military Tribunals or Commissions in the
Far East. However, the information that the UNWCC collected was
relied upon by various governments in subsequent national prosecu43
tions.
Between 1942 and 1945, political support for the body waned. As
the United States began to dominate the IMT proceedings and conduct
its Subsequent Proceedings pursuant to CCL No. 1044 in the very same
courthouse at Nuremberg, U.S. support for the UNWCC evaporated.
The UNWCC's moral influence over governments to compel cooperation in the pursuit of accused war criminals and to either prosecute or
extradite such persons was substantially eroded. This was particularly
evident with respect to those accused Italian war criminals who were
45
never prosecuted.
E. The InternationalMilitary Tribunalat Nuremberg
While the UNWCC was collecting evidence, the Four Major Allied
Powers had to reach a decision with respect to the prosecution and
punishment of war criminals, particularly the leaders of the Nazi
regime, as called for by the Moscow Declaration signed in 1943 by
Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin.4 6 Britain initially favored summary
execution of "major" war criminals, such as Hitler or Himmler on the
basis that "their 'guilt was so black' that it was 'beyond the scope of
any judicial process."' 47 In comparison, as early as the discussions at
the Palace of St. James in 1942, Stalin advocated a special international
43. By 1948, European countries and the United States had brought a total of 969 cases in
their respective courts, involving 3470 accused, of whom 952 were sentenced to death, 1905
were imprisoned, and 613 were acquitted. HISTORY OF THE UNWCC, supra note 32, at 518.
44. See FRANK M. BUSCHER, THE U.S. WAR CRIMES TRIAL PROGRAM IN GERMANY, 19461955 (1989); TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE
NURE BERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw No. 10 (1949); JOHN A.
APPLEMAN, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (1954).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 83-88. The United States and Britain prosecuted a small
number of Italian war criminals, mostly those accused of committing crimes against their
respective military personnel. Eighty-one defendants were tried in 40 proceedings by the British in
Italy. See R. JOHN PRITCHARD & JANE L. GARWOOD-CUTLER, THE ALLIED WAR CRIMES TRIALS
OF SUSPECTRD ITALIAN WAR CRIMINALS, 1945-1949: A FORGOTTEN LEGACY WiTH VITAL
LESSONS FOR THE PRESENT DAY (forthcoming). Those accused by UNWCC of war crimes outside
Italy, however, were, to the best of the author's knowledge, never prosecuted.
46. Declaration on Security (The Moscow Declaration), 9 DEP'T ST. BULL. 308 (1943), reprinted
in 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 5 (1944). One of the most influential steps toward the establishment of
the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was the convening of an ostensibly private group of
statesmen, scholars and public officials under the name of the London International Assembly.
That group developed many of the concepts and some of the norms that went into the Statute
of the IMT. See THE PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRmuis: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE LONDON
INTERNATIONAL ASSEMBLY (Report of Commission 1) (1944).
47. TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 29.
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tribunal for prosecuting Hitler, his close advisers, and senior military

leaders.4 8 Similarly, the United States and France both preferred the
establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute war criminals.'19
The Americans and French wanted the tribunal to record history,
educate the world, and serve as a future deterrent. Great Britain was
fearful that fair procedures would allow the accused to use the tribunal
as a forum for propaganda and self-justification. Essentially because of
the United States' insistence through President Truman and Justice
Robert Jackson, the idea of an international criminal tribunal came
into fruition.
The proceedings were not without flaws. The U.S.S.R. used the
tribunal to rewrite history: they sat in judgment over Germans accused
of crimes for which the Soviet'Union was responsible, like the disappearance of approximately 15,000 Polish prisoners, including between
8,300 and 8,400 Polish officers. 50 Moreover, Britain's fears that the
IMT proceedings would provide the accused with a platform for selfjustification were validated when Goering outdid Robert Jackson during his cross-examination and as his lawyer harangued the Tribunal for
two days. 51 Nevertheless, the evidence of the horrible acts committed
overshadowed anything that the defendants or their lawyers had to say.
Ultimately, the higher values and goals sought to be achieved by the
United States, France, and Great Britain prevailed.
Because the four major Allied Powers had different national criminal
procedures, drafting the IMT Charter was particularly difficult.52 While
British and American procedures were both adversarial in nature and
48. Id. at 26. See also ARON N. TRmNIN, HITLERITE RESPONSBIUTY UNDER CRIMINAL LAW
(Rothstein trans., 1945) (1942). In 1946, Professor Trainin recalled his contribution to the
prosecutions of German war criminals in A.N. Trainin, /e Tribunal Militair Intcrnational ct lk
Procn de Nuremberg, in 17 REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 263 (1946). The USSR
was, however, dealing with alleged war criminals within their territory by summary execution.
TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 52.
49. TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 32.
50. J.K. ZAWODNY, DEATH IN HE FOREST: THE STORY OF THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
at 5 (1962).
51. See, eg., TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 319.
52. This difficulty was also faced by the judges of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in
elaborating Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The Rules were adopted by the Tribunal on
February 11, 1994. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia
since 1991 (ICTFY), 2d Sess., Ruder of Procedhire and Evidence adopted on 11 February 1994, U.N.
Doc. IT132 (1994). Changes to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence continued on an ad hoc
basis until September 1996.
So far, the Tribunal has amended its rules 11 times. These many changes also evidenced the
fact that international prosecutions require sui generis rules and that domestic legal experiences
may nor be relevant to such processes. Some of these considerations were raised at the Second
Session of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
in connection with discussions and proposals on rules of procedure and evidence. Rcport of th/e
PrepatoryCommittee on the Establishmentof an InternationalCriminalCourt, Vol. I, U.N. GAOR, 5 1,t
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based on the common law, France had a civil law system, and the Soviet
Union had its own new brand of "socialist justice."" 3 The representatives
of the Allies reconciled their different legal systems in a mixed process. 54 The London Agreement ,of August 8, 1945 established the IMT
and had an annex containing the charter of the new tribunal. 55 The
legal amalgamation, according to Justice Jackson, worked to the advantage of the defendants. They could, for example, take the stand and
testify under oath in their own defense or simply present an unsworn
at the end of a trial without submitting to
statement to the court
56
cross-examination.
The drafters were also faced with the arduous task of defining the
crimes for which the defendants would be prosecuted. The Charter
ultimately provided in Article 6 for the prosecution of the following
substantive crimes: (a) crimes against peace; (b) war crimes; and (c) crimes

Sess., Supp. No. 22, paras. 212-93, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996) [hereinafter PreparatoryCommittee
Report].
For a discussion of the Tribunal's rules, see M. CHERIF BASSIOuNI (WITHTHE COLLABORATION
OF PETER MANIKAS), THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA (1996) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, YUGOSLAVIA TRIBUNAL]; VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1995) [hereinafter MORRIS & SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE].
53. See, e.g., THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF THE USSR (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Valeri M.
Savirsky eds., 1979); SOVIET CRImINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (Harold Berman trans., 2d ed.
1972); HAROLD BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE USSR (1963).
54. See John F Murphy, Norms of Criminal Procedure at the International Military Tribunal, in
THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (George Ginsburgs & Vladimir N.
1990). The same mixed approach favoring the Common law's adversary-accuKudriavtsev eds.,
satorial model is evident in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTFY, see supra note
52, and the proposals presented to the 1996 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, supra note 52.
55. Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945,
82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544, 3 Bevans 1238 [hereinafter London Agreement]; Agreement for
the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945,
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 59 Star. 1544, 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284
[hereinafter London Charter].
56. REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS at x-xi (U.S. Gov't Prtg. Off. 1949) [hereinafter
JACKSON REPORT]. It should be noted, however, that from a procedural and evidentiary legal
perspective, the INIT was not without fault. At the trial, defendants were frequently denied the
right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses that were available to the prosecution.
Instead, they had to use affidavits. There was no appeal, a right now guaranteed in the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Even Justice Jackson noted these mistakes
in his report to the President, wherein he admits to mistakes in the "proceedings of this novelty."
Id. at 440.
Since World War II, however, the impact of international and regional human rights norms
and standards have significantly affected criminal procedures in most countries of the world. See,
e.g.,
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A COMPENDIUM OF UNITED NATIONS NOnS AND STANDARDS (1994); M.
Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of CriminalJustice: Identifying InternationalProcedural
Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235
(1993).
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against humanity. 57 From the perspective of the principles of legality,
the easiest to define of the three crimes was "war crimes." War crimes
in Article 6(b) included customary law as identified, inter alia, by
reference to the 1907 Hague Convention 58 and conventional law as
evidenced in the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War.59 A more difficult legal issue was whether "crimes
against humanity" under Article 6(c) existed under a combination of
sources of international law, namely conventions, custom, and general
principles of law. 60 Because "crimes against humanity" had not been a
part of treaty law, the Allies needed to avoid a rigid interpretation of
the principles of legality in order to avoid enacting ex post facto
legislation that could be successfully challenged in court. Thus, the
rationale for "crimes against humanity" was predicated on a theory of
jurisdictional extension of war crimes. The reasoning was that war
crimes applied to certain protected persons, namely civilians, in time
of war between belligerent states, and "crimes against humanity" merely
extended the same "war crimes" proscriptions to the same category of
protected persons within a particular state, provided it is linked to the
initiation and conduct of aggressive war or to war crimes. 61 As a result
of this interpretation, crimes committed before 1939 were excluded
from prosecution.
It is evident from the adoption of Article 6(c) that the United States
radically changed its position from that taken before the 1919 Commission that "crimes against the laws of humanity" did not exist in
positive international law.62 Yet no legal development took place between 1919 and 1945 that could have explained this change of position. In the case of Nazi atrocities, the facts drove the law, and politics
were also a consideration.
Prosecution for "crimes against peace" was without legal precedent,
save for the failed attempt after World War I to prosecute the Kaiser
under Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles. 63 Article 6(a) of the
Charter provided for the prosecution of those who directed or partici-

57. London Charter, supra note 55, art. 6.
58. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 14.
59. The 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27,
1929, 118 L.N.T.S. 343, 47 Stat. 2021, 2 Bevans 932.
60. CR bms AGAINST HumNIyr, supra note 12, at 18-32; Schwelb, supra note 13.
61. See CRMES AGAINST HuMANITY,supra note 12, at 18-47; M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Law and the Holocaust, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 201 (1979). See also
Leila Sadat Wexler, The
Interpretationof the Nuremberg Principlesby the French Court of Cassation, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 289 (1994); Schwelb, supra note 13.
62. Annex II, supra note 16, at 144. Curiously, however, to date, there is no international
convention on "crimes against humanity." See M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Crimes Againit Humanity":
The Needfor a Specialized Convention, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457 (1994).

63. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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pated in a war of aggression against other nations in violation of
treaties and the principles of international law. This was the best legal
basis the Allies could come up with.6 The Soviet Union wanted to
include the phrase "by the European Axis," 65 in order to make the
initiation of a war of aggression a crime limited to the leaders of the
European Axis and avoid the application of that same norm to any of
its own conduct. 66 Justice Jackson, then representative of the United
States at the London Conference, prevailed in his view that the limiting
phrase should not be included. Jackson stated that the American
representatives would not draft a law that would be akin to a "bill of
attainder," which is prohibited by the United States Constitution 67 and
that the prohibition against aggression is universal and could also be
applied against the United States. 68 The United States had thus also
changed its position from that of post-World War I by deciding to
make war of aggression a crime under international law, 69 a position
that subsequently changed once again during the Cold War era when
70
it was no longer politically convenient.
64. The Allies particularly relied on the 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as
an Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand Pact or Pact of Paris) of August 27, 1928 as
a legal justification for "crimes against peace." 94 L.N.T.S. 57, 46 Star. 2343, reprintedin 22 Am.
J. INT'L L. 171 (Supp. 1928).
65. Annex II, supra note 16, at 65.
66. See JACKSON REPORT, supra note 56, at vii-viii. It is likely that the Soviet Union desired
to avoid codifying a broad definition of crimes against peace that could be used again in the
future.
sWithout
such a definition, the Soviet Union would be free to act as it wished without
repercussions. The lack of definition would also allow the USSR to avoid being held criminally
accountable for its invasion and seizure of a part of Poland in the fall of 1940, pursuant to the
secret Pact of Non-Aggression between Germany and the USSR, as well as its subsequent invasion
of Finland.
67. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, c. 3; art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
68. JACKSON REPORT, supra note 56, at vii-viii.
69. See, eg., M. Cherif Bassiouni & Benjamin Ferencz, The CrimeAgainst Peace, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CiumiNAL LAw 174-76 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3 vols., 1987); BENJAmIN FERENC,
DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION, THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (1975). The U.N. Charter prohibits aggression, and the Security Council
has the power under Chapter VII to take measures, including sanctions, to preserve and maintain
peace. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 2(3), 2(4), 39-51. See generally THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: A
COMMENTARY (Bruno Simma ed., 1994). It is noteworthy that there has never been an international convention explicitly making aggression an international crime. Other than the General
Assembly's 1974 Resolution, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 143,
U.N. Doc. A19631 (1974), defining aggression and adopted by consensus, there is no definition
of that crime. Consequently, its definition has posed problems to the 1996 Preparatory Committee
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. See PrepatoryCommittee Report, supra note
52.
70. See Concerning Militay and ParamilitaryActivities In and Against Nicaragua(Nicar v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (explaining the position of the United States in connection with the
case). Commenting on that position, see THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS (Lori Fisher Damrosch ed., 1987). In support of the United States' particular position, see
JEANNE KIRKPATRICK & ALAN GERSON, RIGHT V. MIGHT. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE (1989). For different perspectives, see LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
ORDER (Lori Fisher Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991).
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The IMT Charter developed the law of armed conflict in a progressive manner. Article 8 of the IMT Charter removed the defense of
"obedience to superior orders," making it only a mitigating factor that
would not exonerate a defendant from being held responsible for his
actions. This was contrary to what most military laws provided for at
the time World War II started. 71 The judgments of the IMT did not
entirely follow the prescription of Article 8, however, and allowed the
defense when the subordinate had no alternative moral choice in refus72
ing to carry out the order.
Once the procedural and legal issues were resolved, the IMT Charter
was appended to the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, which
established the IMT.73 The London Agreement was signed by the Four
Major Allies and later acceded to by nineteen statesj 4 The Four Major
Allies assembled individual prosecution teams, which also had their
own investigators. The American team provided most of the documents that were used as evidence as well as practical and logistical
5
support for the other teams.7
At the time, over one million Allied troops occupied Germany, with
complete access to prisoners of war, civilian witnesses, and government
documents. The collection of evidence was made easy by what Telford
Taylor has called the "Teutonic penchant for meticulous record keeping."76

71. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 264-65 (lsr ed. 1906). The BRrTSH MANuAL
OF MILITARY LAW, No. 443 (1914) relied upon Oppenheim in its formulation. Oppenheim's
recognition of the defense remained in the first five editions up to 1940, when it changed to
become the basis for the IMT's Article 8 which denied the defense. U.S. Dep't of the Army, Field
Manual 27-10 (1940) reflected the same position in § 345(1). On November 15, 1944, a revision
of § 345(1) limited, bur retained, a qualified defense. But ste U.S. DEP'T OF THE AMi, FIELD
MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956). For a historical evolution of the question,
see Leslie C. Green, Superior Ordersand Command Responsibility, 27 CAN. YB. INT'L L. 167 (1989);
Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibilityfor War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1973).
72. See generally NIco KEIJZER, MILITARY OBEDIENCE (1978); LESLIE C. GREEN, SUPERIOR
ORDERS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (1976); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE DEFENCE OF
'OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS' IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965); EKKEHART MULLER-RAPPARD, L'ORDRE SUP9RIEUR MILITAIRE ET LAREsPONSIBILIT9 PANALE DU SUBORDONNA (1965).
73. See London Agreement, supra note 55; London Charter, supra note 55.
The sear of the IMT was the subject of considerable discussion among the Four Major Powers.
Berlin was finally agreed upon, at the insistence of the USSR, for its symbolic significance,
Nuremberg, however, was to be the effective seat from the beginning. The reason at first was
quite simple, the German courthouse (actually the sear of a court of appeals) was the only one
that was not destroyed or heavily damaged. Subsequently, it was advanced that the choice was
symbolic, because Hitler had first announced plans for "ethnic cleansing" in a speech in that city
in 1936. However, the former practical reason was probably the basis for the decision.
74. See London Agreement, supra note 55.
75. There was no reliance on the work of the UNWCC. See supra text accompanying notes
41-43.
76. TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 57.
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The IMT indicted twenty-four persons, of whom twenty-two were
prosecuted. Three defendants were acquitted, twelve were sentenced to
death by hanging, three were sentenced to life imprisonment, and the
others were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from ten to
twenty years.77 Hermann Goering committed suicide at the end of the
trial. All of the defendants were German and no other defendants from
the European Axis Powers were indicted or tried before the IMT. No
Allied Military personnel were prosecuted for any war crimes against
Germans. These proceedings, even though just with respect to the
78
accused, were one-sided.
R Control Council Law No. 10
Subsequent to the London Charter, the Allies, by virtue of Germany's unconditional surrender, exercised sovereignty over Germany
and enacted Allied Control Council Law No. 10 which permitted the
Allies to prosecute German nationals in their respective zones of occupation.7 9 Political will, sufficient resources, control of the territory, and
the nature of the German military and civil service systems combined
to make the prosecutions at Nuremberg effective. The same consideration made the Subsequent Proceedings under CCL 10 by the Americans, British, and French equally effective. The Russians, however,

77. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 12, at 210.
78. For a critical perspective of the RMT, see AUGUST VON KNIEREm, THE NUREMBERG
TRIALS (1959); Hans Ehard, The Nuremberg Trialagainst the Major War Criminalsand International
Law, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 223 (1949); A. Frederick Mignone, After Nuremberg, Tokyo, 25 Thx. L.
REV. 475 (1947); Gordon Ireland, Ex Post Factofrom Rome to Tokyo, 21 TEMPLE L.Q. 27 (1947).
Many of the concerns raised by the authors cited above are also present in the following: Georg
Schwarzenberger, The Judgment of Nuremberg, 21 TL. L. REV. 329 (1947); Hans Kelsen, Will the
Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in InternationalLaw, 1 INT'L L.Q. 153 (1947);
Gordon W. Forbes, Some Legal Aspects of the Nuremberg Trial, 24 CAN. B. REv. 584 (1946); A.L.
Goodhart, The Legality of the Nuremberg Trials, 58 JURID. REv. 1 (1946). For the views of four
defense counsels at the iTh, see Herbert Kraus, The Nuremberg Trials of the Major War Criminals:
Reflections after Seventeen Years, 13 DEPAUL L REv. 233 (1964) (Chief Counsel for Schacht); Carl
Haensel, The Nuremberg Trials Revisited, 13 DEPAUL L. REV. 248 (1964) (Chief Counsel for the
S.S. and S.D.); Otto Kranzbuhler, Nuremberg Eighteen Years Afterwards, 14 DEPAUL L. REv. 333
(1965) (Chief Counsel for Donitz); Otto Pannenbecker, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 14
DEPAUL L. REv. 348 (1965) (Chief Counsel for Frick). For two other authors who address the
question of Allied violations, see JAMES BACQUE, OTHER LOSSES: THE SHOCKING TRUTH BEHIND
THE MASS DEATHS OF DISARMED GERMAN SOLDIERS AND cIVILIANS UNDER GENERAL EISENHOWER'S COMMAND (1991) and ALFRED M. DE ZAYAS, THE WEHRMACHT WAR CRIMES BuREAU: 1939-1945 (1989). In the latter book, the author reveals that the German Army established a bureau to record war crimes committed by the Allies against German military personnel.
These apparently uncontroverted violations were never pursued by the Allies.
79. Allied Control Council law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
against Peace and against Humanity, 20 December 1945, Official Gazette of the Control Council
for Germany, No. 3, Berlin, January 31, 1946, reprintedin BENJAMIN B. FERENcz, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMuNAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE 488 (1980) [hereinafter CCL 10).
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proceeded in a summary manner with little or no regard for legal
80
considerations.
Prosecutions in the Allied zones of occupation could be said to be in
the nature of domestic, as opposed to international, prosecutions because the Allies were presumably exercising sovereign power in Germany as a result of that country's unconditional surrender.S' CCL 10
was, nevertheless, patterned after the IMT's charter, and Article II of
the IMTFE provided for the same three crimes as in the IMT's statute
Article 6. The only difference in Article II(c), concerning "crimes
against humanity," was the removal of the connection to the initiation
82
of war or to war crimes.
G. The Instrument of Surrender to Italy
Since CCL 10 was promulgated by the Four Major Allies acting as
the sovereign authority in Germany, it did not apply to other Axis
countries which were also defeated and occupied by the Allies. Thus,
for example, Italy was occupied by the United States and Great Britain
subject to a Surrender Treaty, which provided for the prosecution and
extradition of war criminals.8 3 The goals of the Treaty, however, were
supplanted by the fear of communism that was pervasive in Europe.
The Major Powers believed that reformed fascists were the best opponents of communism and therefore did not actively pursue their prosecution or extradition for fear of the internal political repercussions. The
UNWCC listed 750 Italian war criminals whose different charges
included the following: 84 illegal use of poisonous gas in violation of
the 1925 Geneva Protocol8 against Ethiopian civilians and combatants, killing of innocent civilians and POWs, torture and mistreatment
of prisoners, bombing ambulances, destruction of cultural property,
and other violations of the laws of armed conflicts during the ItaloAbyssinian war.8 6 In addition, the UNWCC had extensive evidence of
80. With respect to prosecutions in certain eastern and central European countries as well as
extrajudicial execution, see Istvmn Deik, Post World War II PoliticalJasticein a HistoricalPerspcdct,
149 MIL. L. REv. 137 (1995).

81. The nature of the separate proceedings was different. The U.S. proceedings were before
civilian judges, while the British, French, and Russian trials were before military courts. Sce
TAYLOR and BUSCHEeR, supra note 44.

82. CCL 10, supra note 79, art. 11(c).
83. The Instrument of Surrender of Italy, art. 29, Sept. 29, 1943, 61 Stat. 2742, 2746, 3

Bevans 775, 781.
84. See CRiusEs AGAINST HuMANIY, supra note 12, at 85, 227. Various governments submitted to the UNWCC charges against Italians. The total number of charged and listed Italian war
criminals equalled 1204. HISTORY OF THE UNWCC, supra note 32, at 511.
85. The use of poisonous gas was in violation of the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,
June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, T.I.A.S. No. 8061.
86. HISTORY OF THE UNWCC, supra note 32, at 68, 189-90.
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crimes committed by the Italian military personnel in Greece, Libya,
and Yugoslavia during World War II. The governments of Ethiopia,
Greece, Libya, and Yugoslavia requested extradition of the war criminals pursuant to Article 29 of the instrument of surrender of Italy, but
the occupying forces of Italy, the United States, and the United Kingdom did not act on their requests.8 7 Subsequently, in 1946, the Italian
government denied requests for extradition. 88 In short, political views
once again prevailed over justice considerations.

H. The Far Eastern Commission and the InternationalMilitary Tribunal
for the FarEast at Tokyo
The Far Eastern Commission (FEC)89 was agreed to in Moscow in
December 1945 as a measured response to the request of the U.S.S.R.
The FEC gave the U.S.S.R. some element of control over the future of
Japan as a reward for its late entry into the war, but left control of the
FEC to the United States. It consisted of eleven states, with the four
Major Allies having veto power. The Commission, whose seat was in
Washington, transmitted its directives to an advisory group known as
the Allied Council for Japan, seated in Tokyo. The United States, the
U.K., China, and the U.S.S.R. were the only members of the Allied
Council for Japan, and they were to oversee the occupational policies
and practices for Japan.
The FEC was not an investigative body but a political one, which
was to establish a policy of occupation for Japan and to coordinate the
Allied policies in the Far East. The Commission played an important
role in providing the joint Allied political umbrella for prosecution
and other policies related to suspected war criminals, their trials, the
carrying out of their sentences, and their release. Ultimately, however,
"the Far Eastern Commission became little more than a debating
society, and when a peace treaty was finally signed with Japan, it died
a quiet death." 9
Control over occupational matters rested with General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP).
Virtually every aspect of justice in the Far East was guided by MacArthur's views and his political perspectives on the region. General
MacArthur opposed the Commission's establishment because it allowed
the U.S.S.R. a role and a veto. As he stated, "The very nature of its
87. See supra note 45.
88. CRi sS AGAiNST HumANrrY, supra note 12, at 228.
89. See generally Activities of the Far Eastern Commission, Report by the Secretary General, February
26-July 10, 1947, 16 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 804-06 (1947) [hereinafter FEC Report].
90. CIMEs AGAiNST HuMANITy,supra note 12, at 293.
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composition and procedures eventually made the Far Eastern Commission ineffective." 91
On January 19, 1946, General MacArthur, in his capacity as the
SCAP for the Pacific Theater, and on behalf of the FEC, promulgated
an -order establishing the IMTFE. 92 Unlike the IMT, the IMTFE was
not a treaty-based creation. Why the IMT and not the IMTFE required
a treaty for its creation has never been explained, but several political
considerations seem relevant. First, the Soviet Union had entered the
war against Japan a few weeks before the latter was defeated, and the
United States was concerned about the ambitions of the Soviet Union
in the Far East. Furthermore, the United States did not want the
U.S.S.R. to have any influence over these proceedings. 93 The United
States was also concerned about Japan's post-World War II course of
conduct. Thus, everything that was done by the FEC and the IMTFE

91. DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, REMaINISCENCES 292 (1964).

92. See Special Proclamation: Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far
East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, at 3, 4 Bevans 20 [hereinafter IMTFE Proclamation].
On the same day General MacArthur issued his proclamation, the Charter for the IMTFE was
adopted. Pursuant to a policy decision by the FEC, the Charter was later amended by General's
Order No. 20, issued by MacArthur. See Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East, approved Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, at 11, 4 Bevans 27 [hereinafter IMTFE
Amended Charter], The IMTFE consisted of 11 members. Nine were representatives from
countries which had signed Japan's surrender agreement: Australia, Canada, China, France, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Sce
Instrument of Surrender by Japan, Sept. 2, 1945, 59 Star. 1733, 1735, 3 Bevans 1251, 1252.
India and the Philippines were subsequently added as members due to their status as members
of the FEC. See IMTFE Amended Charter, supra. The arraignment of the 28 defendants on 55
counts was on May 3, 1946, and the judgment was rendered on November 11, 1948, two years
after the IMT's. The charges were for "crimes against peace" and "war crimes," not for "crimes
against humanity" and no organization was charged. At the IMT, by contrast, the SS and SA
were charged with, and found to be, criminal organizations. See APPLEMAN, supra note 44, at
238.
For a complete historical record of the ,MTFE,see generally THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL:
THE COMPLETE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY nIBIUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST IN TaENTY-Two VOLUMES (R. John Pritchard & Sonia Magbanua Zaide
eds., 1981); THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAi: THE COMPREHENSIVE INDEX AND GUIDE TO THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST IN FIVE VOL-

uMES (R. John Pritchard & Sonia Magbanua Zaide eds., 1981); YUK TANAKA, HIDDEN HORRORS:
JAPANESE WAR CRIMES IN WORLD WAR II (1996).

93. The political and military tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union during
the IMTFE proceedings affected the proceedings in many ways. For instance, all information
related to the existence of a bacteriological weapons research lab located in Manchuria during
World War II was purposely kept from the IMTFE. Professor Bernard Riling believed that this
information was withheld by American military authorities who wanted to reap the benefits of
the research and keep the information from the Soviets. Professor Howard Levie has a differing
view, however, believing that the information was withheld by both the Americans and the Soviets
because both countries had access to the information and wanted to prevent the other from
obtaining research results. See HOWARD LEVIE, TERRORISM IN WAR: THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES
141 (1992). Professor Levie highlights Soviet criticisms of the IMTFE, including accusations that
the IMTFE displayed anti-Soviet tendencies and was influenced by the overwhelming American
presence in its administration. Id at 145.
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was guided by MacArthur's wishes, as were the United States Military
Commissions to try Japanese Military personnel in the Philippines and
other areas of the Far East Military Theater of Operations that he
subsequently established pursuant to his authority as the SCAP in that
Pacific Japan Theater. Although MacArthur tried to preserve the appearance of detachment from the various legal proceedings he had set
in motion, his heavy hand was evident throughout.
On April 3, 1946, the FEC issued a policy decision on the "Appre'94
hension, Trial and Punishment of War Criminals in the Far East.
Article 6(a) of the FEC's decision empowered the SCAP, General MacArthur, to establish an agency, acting under his command, to investigate reports of war crimes, collect and analyze evidence, and arrange
for the apprehension of suspects. Article 6(a) also gave the SCAP the
power to decide what individuals or organizations would be prosecuted
and before which court they would appear.95
Participants in the FEC, and later in the IMTFE, were chosen on a
representational basis. Each individual member acted as a representative
of his country's government, and not in an individual capacity. 96 This
led to a politicization of the FEC and the IMTFE and affected the
internal workings of these bodies as well as the quality of justice they
administered. The proceedings themselves were fraught with procedural irregularities and marred by abuses of judicial discretion. 97 The
defendants were chosen on the basis of political criteria, and their trials
were generally unfair. 98 Others, such as Allied military personnel, were
conspicuously absent from the list of defendants. None of the Allies
was prosecuted for war crimes. In addition, the application of the law
with respect to some of the defendants was at least dubious, if not

94. See FEC Report, supra note 89.
95. See FEC Report, supra note 89, at art. 6(a). Accused war criminals were divided into Class
A, B, and C. The first IMTFE proceedings were against 28 senior Japanese officials considered
Class A suspected war criminals, though clearly some of them did not deserve being placed in
that category, according to most experts on the subject. For an early appraisal, see Solis Horwitz,
The Tokyo Trial, 465 INT'L RECONCiUATiON 473 (1950). For a more recent appraisal, see LEvis,
supra note 93, at 141.
96. While the choice of judges at the IMT was made by the respective Four Major Powers,
the U.S., British, and French judges and their alternates were highly qualified and known for
their personal integrity and independence. The judges from the USSR, who were military officers,
were believed to be less knowledgeable than their western counterparts and subject to their
government's directives, though their performance on the bench paralleled that of their western
counterparts. This was not the case at the IMTFE, however. With the exception of Rbling
(Netherlands), Pol (India), and Bernard (France), many of the judges appeared politically motivated, especially the president, and General MacArthur's influence seemed rampant. See APPLEzmN, supra note 44, at 239-44 (referring to page numbers in the transcript evidencing prejudice
and unfairness, particularly by Presiding Judge Sir William Webb of Australia). LEviE, supra note
93, is equally critical.
97. See APPLEMAN, supra note 44, at 239-58.
98. See CRIMES AGAINST HumiNITn, supra note 12, at 211-12.
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erroneous. 99 The execution of sentences was also inconsistent, controlled by the political whims of General MacArthur, who had the power
to grant clemency, reduce sentences, and release convicted war criminals on parole. 100 Ultimately, not one of the twenty-five convicted
persons who was sentenced to prison remained incarcerated for his full
term; every one was released by the end of the 1950s.101 This was also
true of all those who were convicted as war criminals by the Allied
10 2
military tribunals in the Far East.
In 1949, the FEC issued a formal advisory to all nineteen Allied
powers in the Far East that Japanese war crimes trials should be held
no later than September 30, 1949.103 Subsequently, the Treaty of Peace
with Japan, signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951 by fortyeight States, provided in Article II that all convicted war criminals
should be transferred to Japan to serve the remainder of their sentences
under the SCAP's control.10 4 This was done to effectuate early releases
and therefore, between 1951 and 1957, all convicted war criminals in
the Far East were released on parole or had their sentences com10 5
muted.
Previously, however, on November 3, 1946, Emperor Hirohito, on
the occasion of the promulgation of Japan's new American-inspired
Constitution, signed an Imperial Restrict (edict) pardoning all members of the Japanese armed forces who may have committed offenses
during the course of the war.106 The edict was tacitly approved by
General MacArthur, but it was not publicized to avoid opposition from
public opinion in Allied countries. Subsequently, Japan passed Law No.
103 of 1952, establishing a Commission to oversee the repatriation and
release of Japanese convicted war criminals. 0 7 This Japanese Commission acted in reliance on Article II of the Treaty of Peace, which
provided for the repatriation to Japan of convicted war criminals. 08
Unlike in Germany, where those accused and convicted of war
crimes became, for the most, pariahs in their society, the Japanese did
99. Bernard V.A. R6ling, The Nuremberg and the Tokyo Trials in Retrospect, in 1 A ThEATIsE ON
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 600-01, 605-07 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds.,
1973).
100. See LRvlE, supra note 93.
101. See John Mendelsohn, War Crimes Trials and Clemency in Germanyandjapan,in U1IERICANS
AS PROCONSULS: UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GEF.IANY AND JAPAN, 1944-1952

226 (Robert Wolfe ed., 1984).
102. Id
103. R. John Pritchard, The Gift of Clemency Following British War Crimes Trias in the FarEast,
1946-1947, 7 CRiM. LE 15, 18 (1996).
104. Pritchard, supra note 103, at 37.
105. Id. at 37-49.
106. Id. at 24.
107. Id. at 38.
108. Id. at 37.
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not view such persons as criminals but as victims. 1°9 For the Japanese,
110
the trials were victors' vengeance couched in terms of victors' justice.
L Politics of Defendant Selection in the FarEast
The influence of politics on the selection of defendants was evident
in the FEC policy decision on February 3, 1950 not to prosecute the
Emperor Hirohito of Japan as a war criminal.11' The decision was based
on a need preserve the image of the Emperor, who had agreed to the
unconditional surrender ofJapan as a means of ensuring better political
cooperation by the post-World War II Japanese ruling elite and to
obtain support for the administration of the occupied Japanese territo12
ries.'
Politics also played an important role subsequent to the IMTFE
prosecutions, when the United States conducted trials in the Philippines,"13 and Australia, China, France, the Netherlands, the Philippines, the U.K., the United States, and the U.S.S.R. all conducted
109. Indeed, Class A war criminals convicted by the IMTFE became members of Cabinet, and
one became Prime Minister:
Shigemitsu Mamoru, a career diplomat, who was Foreign Minister in Tojo Midelki's
Wartime Cabinet and who signed on behalf of Japan the Instrument of Surrender on
September 2, 1945, on board the USS Missouri, was sentenced by the IMTFE to seven
years imprisonment. He was released on parole 21 November 1950, and in November
1951 he was given clemency. Shigernitsu became Foreign Minister in December 1954.
During his two years as Minister, he was instrumental in obtaining the Allies' clemency
and ultimately, in 1957, the release of all Japanese held in captivity. On 7 April 1957,
the Japanese Government announced that with the concurrence of a majority of the
Allied Powers represented on the IMTFE, all major Japanese war criminals were
granted clemency and unconditionally released forthwith. Kishi Nobusake, another
Class A criminal suspect, was tried and convicted in further proceedings after the first
Tokyo Trial, but later became Prime Minister in January 1956 and served until July
1960. He also held the portfolio of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for some time in
1956.
Letter from Dr. R. John Pritchard to the author (Jan. 30, 1996) (on file with the author).
110. See generally A.C. BRocMAsN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG, THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE
TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS (1987); THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL (C. Hosoya et al. eds.,

1986);

PHILIP R. PICCIGALLO, THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR CRIM S OPERATIONS IN

THE EAST 1945-1951 (1979); SABURO SHIROYAMA, WAR CRIuMNAL: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF
HiROTA KOKs (1977); RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTOR'S VENGEANCE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES
TRIAL (1971).
111. 22 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 244 (1950). MacArthur reportedly instigated the decision because

he felt that prosecuting the Emperor would make pacification of Japan a difficult task, costing
the United States many casualties at the hands of Japanese guerrillas.
112. WILLIAM MANCHESTER, AMERICAN CAESAR: DOUGLAS MACARTHUR 1880-1964, 484-

91(1978).
113. For the two major cases, see In re Yamasbita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Homma v. United States,
327 U.S. 759 (1946). See also RICHARD LAEL, THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT. WAR CRIMES AND
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY (1982); A. FRANK REEL, THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA (1949).

A description of MacArthur's role in this case and of the unfairness of these proceedings is
described in lay terms by MANCHESTER, supra note 112, at 484-85. But see MAcARTHUR, supra

note 91, at 318-19.

HarvardHuman RightsJournal / Vol. 10
trials in the Pacific Theater." 4 Unlike proceedings in Germany under
CCL 10, the Allied Military Prosecutions in the Far East were only for
war crimes; they did not include "crimes against humanity."
The prosecution, conviction, and execution of General Tomoyuki
Yamashita in the Philippines' 15 exemplifies how political considerations resulted in the release of convicted war criminals and in condemnation of those whose role in the atrocities was negligible or non-existent. General Yamashita was the last Japanese Commander in the
Philippines before the Allied Forces landed.1 16 MacArthur, who had
escaped, from the Philippines before it fell to Japanese forces, had
vowed to return and punish the Japanese for their brutal occupational
practices and for war crimes. MacArthur ordered the trial of Yamashita
even though Yamashita had not ordered or even been aware of any war
crimes; Yamashita had only been in command in the Philippines for
less than a month before it was re-taken by the Allied forces. In
December 1945 General MacArthur set up a special Military Commission to prosecute Japanese war criminals in the Philippines. 117 General
MacArthur influenced the military judges who applied an inappropriate legal standard that has not been applied since in cases of command
responsibility: Yamashita was held responsible for acts of his subordinates which he had not ordered and of which he was unaware. 118 The
114. For example, from 1946 to 1948, the British Army held 305 war crimes trials in the
Pacific Theater. A total of 889 suspected war criminals were tried in 931 prosecutions, of whom
553 were convicted. See Pritchard, supra note 103.

Country
Australia
China
France
Netherlands
Philippines
U.K.

Trl
296
605
39
448
72
314

Accused
924
893
230
1,038
169
933

Convitions
844
504
198
969
133
777

(including proceedings that Canada would have undertaken)
U.S.A.

474
1,409
1,229
R. John Pritchard, The Quality of Mery: Appellant Proceduree, the Confirmation and Rcduction of
Sentences and the Exercise of the Royal Prerogative of Clmency towards Convicted War Criminals, 8
BRITISH WAR CRIMES TRIALS IN THE FAR EAST, 1946-48 (R. John Pritchard ed., 21 vols.,
forthcoming) (manuscript at 8, on file with author).
115. Seesupra note 113.
116. REEL, supra note 113. Reel was a JAG Captain who was one of General Yamashitds defense
counsels at these proceedings. For a critical view, see CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note
12, at 376-82. For other military trials, see LAWRENCE TAYLOR, A TRIAL OF GENERALS (1981).
117. The Military Commission was established by General MacArthur's Special Order 110,
Oct. 1, 1945, para. 24. The record of the trial is found in United States of America v Tomoyui
Yamashita, Records of the Military Commission Established by General Douglas MacArthur,
reprinted in RICHARD L. LAEL, THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT: WAR CRIMES AND COMMAND
RESPONSIBILITY 97 (1982).
118. See Parks, supra note 71, at 1; TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNmi: AN
AMERICAN TRAGEDY (1968).
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United States Supreme Court regrettably denied Yamashita's Petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, but two Justices, Murphy and Rutledge,
wrote compelling dissents. 119
J. Comparison of the Legal Bases for Setting up the IMT, IMTFE, and
CCL 10 and FarEast Allied Military Prosecutions
The use of different legal mechanisms for the establishment of these
ad hoc tribunals produced divergent results as to substance and procedure. The IMT and IMTFE Charters both provided for the prosecution
and punishment of those accused of committing "crimes against peace,"
"war crimes," and "crimes against humanity."120 The respective instruments are substantially the same, with a few exceptions. One such
exception is that Article 5(c) of the IMTFE Charter provided that
persecution on political and racial grounds constituted "crimes against
humanity," whereas Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter included religious
grounds as well. Such an inclusion was necessary in the IMT Charter
because of the Holocaust.' 2 1 Also with respect to "crimes against
humanity," the IMT Charter provided that "inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population" were subject to prosecution. The IMTFE
Charter eliminated the phrase "against any civilian population" from
Article 5(c), thereby expanding the class of persons beyond civilians
only. The definition was dubiously broadened "to make punishment
possible for large-scale killing of military personnel in an unlawful
2
2

war." 1

CCL 10, which governed the Subsequent Proceedings of the Allies
in their respective zones of occupation in Germany, also provided for
the prosecution and punishment of "crimes against peace," "war crimes,"
and "crimes against humanity."123 CCL 10 proceedings were not, however, conducted pursuant to a treaty or by promulgation of a military
order by the commanding officer of occupying forces, but rather were
mandated pursuant to a joint decision taken by the four Allies who
occupied Germany after that country's unconditional surrender. The
legal authority advanced by the Allies was that they carried out the
functions of government in Germany. Such a reasoning meant that the
CCL 10 proceedings were part of the domestic law of Germany. But
when each of the four Allies set out its own system of justice, with all
119. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1,26-81 (1946).
120. London Charter, supra note 55; IMTFE Amended Charter, supra note 92.
121. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Law and the Holocaust, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 202
(1979); CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 12, at 34.
122. B.V.A. R6LING, THE TOKYO TIAL AND BEYOND 3 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1993). See also
Bernard V.A. Rling, The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials in Retrospect, in A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CI sINAL LAW 590 Wi.Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973).
123. CCL 10, supra note 79.
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but the United States' being of a military nature, the legal fiction of
national proceedings was inverted. 24
The definition of "crimes against humanity" contained in Article
II(c) of the CCL 10 differed from the IMT and IMTFE Charters in two
ways. First, Article II(c) expanded the list of crimes to include imprisonment, torture, and rape. Second, it eliminated the requirement that
"crimes against humanity" be connected to the war by omitting the
words "before or during the war" contained in Article 6(c) of the IMT's
Charter. Furthermore, with respect to "persecution," Article 11(c) broadened the category of crimes against humanity in a way that strained
the principles of legality by eliminating the requirement that "crimes
against humanity" be in the "execution of or in connection with any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal." Unlike the IMT's
judgment on sentences, the IMTFE's sentences could be unilaterally
reduced by General MacArthur, though he never used that authority. 125
The proceedings in the Far East before separate military tribunals
were sanctioned by the FEC, and to that extent the FEC is somewhat
similar to CCL 10. Each Allied Power prosecuted Japanese and persons
of other nationalities who were their prisoners of war. There was,
however, no treaty or jointly promulgated law defining crimes. Each
Allied Power established its own field military tribunals or commissions which applied its respective military laws and procedures. Although the FEC was a policy body, General MacArthur was the sole
executor of that policy. The legal basis for his authority was that Allied
Forces in the Far East were still under the Allied Power's control and
that included their military trials. Though the FEC was used to achieve
the overall policy goals of the Allies, it was essentially the body
through which the United States actuated some of its occupational
policies. This was evident in the FEC's decision to end prosecutions by
1950 and to repatriate to Japan by 1953 all those who were convicted.
K. The Years of Silence: 1955-1992
By 1955 CCL 10 Proceedings had ended in Germany. Prior to that,
the Far Eastern Military Tribunals had also ended, and by 1958 all
IMTFE convicted war criminals were released. In the west, Germany
continued to prosecute persons charged with crimes arising out of
World War II, as did some other countries. Still, since World War II
there have been many conflicts for which no international investigative
124. CRMES AGAINST HumANiTy, supra note 12, at 87-146 (discussing the principles of
legality). Germany subsequently conducted its own national proceedings before its ordinary
criminal courts.
125. LEvIE, supra note 93, at 142.
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or prosecutorial bodies were ever set up. 126 Justice was the Cold War's
casualty.
However, since the end of the Cold War, new initiatives have developed in connection with the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda and in connection with the establishment of a permanent
international criminal court.
L. The Commission of Experts EstablishedPursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992)
On October 6, 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 780,
establishing a Commission of Experts to investigate and gather evidence of "grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law" in the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia. 127 The history of the Commission and its work is fraught
with the influences of politics. Resolution 780 defined the mandate of
the Commission of Experts as follows:
2. [The Security Council r~equests the Secretary-General to
establish, as a matter of urgency, an impartial Commission of
Experts, to examine and analyze the information submitted
pursuant to resolution 771 (1992) and the present resolution,
together with such further information as the Commission of
Experts may obtain through its own investigations or efforts,
of other persons or bodies pursuant to resolution 771 (1992),
with a view to providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugosla28
via.1

126. See infra note 222.
127. S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Seas., U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992) [hereinafter
Resolution 780). Note that there is an uncanny resemblance between the problems facing the
Commission of Experts and those of the UNWCC. See supra text accompanying notes 34-38.
128. Resolution 780, supra note 127, para. 2. The Secretary-General appointed five members
to the Commission of Experts on October 25, 1992: Professor Frits Kalshoven (Netherlands) as
Chairman; Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni (Egypt); Commander William J. Fenrick (Canada); Judge
Keba M'Baye (Senegal); and Professor Torkel Opsahl (Norway). Professor Kalshoven resigned from
the Commission of Experts due to medical reasons in August 1993 and Professor Opsahl, who
was the Acting Chairman in July-August, passed away in September. As a result, on October 19,
1993, the Secretary-General appointed Professor Bassiouni as Chairman and Professor Christine
Cleiren (Netherlands) and Judge Hanne Sophie Greve (Norway) as new members. Even though
he is a naturalized U.S. citizen, Professor Bassiouni, a native born Egyptian, was listed as being
from Egypt, because it was felt that no representative of the Permanent Members of the Security
Council should be on the Commission of Experts.
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The Commission of Experts interpreted its mandate as requiring the
collection of all relevant information and evidence concerning violations of international humanitarian law that it could secure in light of
its resources and capabilities. 129 The Commission of Experts' efforts
resulted in 65,000 pageq of documents, a database cataloguing the
information in these documents, over 300 hours of videotape, and 3300
pages of analysis, which comprise the Annexes to the Commission of
Experts' Final Report. 130 All of this information and evidence was
turned over to the Tribunal's Prosecutor between April and August
1994.
The political climate and the intensity of the conflict at that time
created a situation in which the pursuit of a political settlement was
deemed a priority.131 The pursuit of justice was a response to international humanitarian concerns and to the terrible atrocities of the war
that the media brought so vividly to the attention of world public
opinion. But, because the major powers did not want to intervene
militarily, the U.N. and EC mediators had neither a stick nor a carrot
to induce cessation of hostilities.
The establishment of an international investigative body with the
broadest possible mandate since Nuremberg was not conducive to the
pursuit of political settlements when the very leaders involved in the
negotiations could also become the targets of the investigation. Political settlement negotiations could not be conducted while the prospects
of criminal investigation and eventual prosecution existed. In the face
129. SeeM. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780: Investigation of Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw in the Former Yugoslavia,
5 CraM. L.F 279-340 (1994); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The United Nations Commission of Expertt
Establishedpursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 88 Am. J. INT'L L 784-805 (1994)
(translated into French and reprinted with modifications in 66 REVUE INTERNATIONALE D11
DROiT Pj2Nsi', 1-2, 1 (1995)); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Investigating Violations ofInternationalHumani.
tarianLaw and Establishingan InternationalCriminalTribunal, 25 SECUnrn.y DIALOGut 409 (1994).
130. The analytical reports were prepared by or under the direction of the Chairman of the
Commission of Experts, M. Cherif Bassiouni. The staff of the Prosector's Office at the Tribunal
reviewed them for purposes of relating sensitive information before the reports were submitted
to the Secretary-General, who then transmitted them to the Security Council in December 1994
as Annexes to the Final Report of the Commission of Experts. See Final Report of the Commission
of Experts Establishedpursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994); Annexes to the Final Report, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. S/1994/674Add.2 (1994).
131. For a more ample description of what follows, see supra note 129. See also M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Sexual Violence: An Invisible Weapon of War in the Former Yugoslavia (Occasional Paper
#1, 1996, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University); and M. Cherif Bas.
siouni, The Commission of Experts Establishedpursuant to Security Council Resolution 780: Imstigating
Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw in the Former Yugoslavia, 7-11 (Occasional Paper #2,
1996, International Human Rights law Institute, DePaul University). With respect to the
conflicting approaches to peace and justice, see Payam Akhavan, The Yugoslav Tribunal At
Crossroads:The Dayton Peace Agreement and Beyond, 18 Hum. Ris. Q. 259 (1996). Cf Anonymous,
Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, id. at 249. This article, which appeared under the authorship
of "Anonymous," probably a member of the Vance-Owen staff, argues that these peace efforts
were not in contradiction with the pursuit of justice.
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of this dilemma, the choice made was to favor politics over justice. As
a result, the Commission never received any funding from the U.N. to
conduct its field investigations. The limited resources provided by the
U.N. only covered the bare minimum of administration costs for a
short period of time) 32 Moreover, the U.N. -frequently placed bureaucratic and financial hurdles in the Commission's way. Consequently, the
Commission resorted to external funding sources and accepted the aid
of volunteers and personnel contributed by certain governments. A
document collection and database operation was set up at the International Human Rights Law Institute (IHRLI) of DePaul University in
Chicago under the direction of this writer and entirely funded by
private sources. While the IHRLI's work was opposed by the U.N.
bureaucracy, it was eventually recognized as contributing a great amount
of information. In fact, it was on the basis of the IHLRIs work that
the Commission produced its Final Report and Annexes.
The Commission of Experts undertook thirty-five field missions
which included mass grave exhumations and the world's largest rape
investigation. Participants in all of these missions, with the exception
of the Commission members and the three secretariat staff members of
the Commission, were either contributed by governments or were
volunteers. As the Commission's work and the IHRLI database work
grew and became substantial enough to evidence patterns of criminality that could not have occurred without design and senior political
and military leadership involvement, the Commission's work became
threatening to the political process. While press reports charging responsibility for "ethnic cleansing," "systematic rape," and other systematic violations of international humanitarian law could be ignored,
evidence substantiating these allegations was a real threat. Consequently, it became politically necessary to terminate the work of the
Commission while attempting to avoid the negative consequences of
such a direct action.
There could have been a problem in circumventing the tenth preambular paragraph of Security Council Resolution 827 which states:
Pending the appointment of a Prosecutor of the International
Tribunal, the Commission of Experts established pursuant to
resolution 780 (1992) should continue on an urgent basis the
collection of information relating to evidence of grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of interna133
tional humanitarian law as proposed in its interim report.

132. This situation is reminiscent of the situation facing the tJNWCC discussed above at text

accompanying notes 34-38.
133. S.C. Res 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at preamble, U.N Doc. S/RES/827 (1993)
[hereinafter Resolution 827].
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Nevertheless, by employing bureaucratic measures, an obstruction of
justice was carried out quietly. An administrative decision was takenprobably at the behest, but certainly with the support of, some of the
Permanent Members-leaving no legal trace of the deed. Thus, the
Chairman was administratively notified that the Commission should
end its work by April 30, 1994. When the Commission's mandate was
terminated, it still had over $250,000 in a trust find and had not yet
completed its Final Report. Between April 30 and December 31, 1994,
the Chairman completed the Final Report and the Annexes and then
continued to work until July 1995 to see that they were published by
the United Nations.
M. The InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia
On February 22, 1993, following the submission of the Commission
of Experts' First Interim Report, 134 the Security Council provided for
the establishment of such a tribunal. 135 Resolution 808 stated that the
Security Council:
Decides that an international criminal tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.136
Resolution 808 requested that the Secretary-General report back on
the matter of establishing an ad hoc international tribunal within sixty
days. 37 The Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to this request
was issued on May 3, 1993 and contained a draft Statute for the
Tribunal and commentaries on the provisions of the Statute. 138 Subsequently, the Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 827
which established the Tribunal and approved the Secretary-General's
draft of the Statute without change. 139 Thus, the Tribunal, with its
134. Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Establishedpursuant to Security Council Resolution
780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, at 20, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1993).
135. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES808 (1993).
136. Id. at preamble.
137. Id.
138. Report of the Secretary-Generalpursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808
(1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter Report of the SecretaryGeneral]. For commentary on the Statute, see BAssIOUNI, YUGOSLAVIA TRIBUNAL, supra note 52,
and MORIS & SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GuInE, supra note 52.
139. Resolution 827, supra note 133, at paras. 1-2. For insights into the establishment of the
ICTFY and the politics surrounding it, see Peter Burns, An InternationalCriminal Tribunal. The
Difficult Union of Principles and Politics, in THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 125
(Roger S. Clark & Madeleine Sann eds., 1996) and David P. Forsythe, Politics and the Intcrnational
Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, id. at 185.
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seat in The Hague, officially came into legal existence on May 25,
1993. The judges were elected on September 15, 1993, and the Prosecutor took office on August 15, 1994. The Tribunal was subsequently
named by its Judges, the "International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia" (ICTFY).
Article 1 of the Statute states that the ICTFY "shall have the power
to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
140
since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute."'
The Statute also establishes individual criminal responsibility, including that of a Head of State, for certain violations committed during
the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTFY. These crimes are (1) grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949;141 (2) violations of the
laws or customs of war;142 (3) genocide; 143 and (4) crimes against humanity.144 Unlike other ad hoc tribunals such as the IMT and IMTFE,
the ICTFY is not limited to the prosecution of some offenders. Rather,
its jurisdiction applies to all those who violated international humanitarian law, irrespective of their side in this conflict.
As a judicial organ, the Tribunal must be independent, according to
established general principles of law.145 The fact that the Tribunal is a
subsidiary organ of the Security Council does not affect the independence of the Tribunal per se, and Article 16 of the Statute specifically provides for the Prosecutor's independence, though he or she
is appointed by the Security Council. 1 6 In fact, the Tribunal is kept
at a distance from the Security Council through its administration by
the Office of Legal Affairs of the U.N. Secretariat. Its internal workings
are subject to the U.N.'s administrative rules. Furthermore, the Security Council does not fund the Tribunal. Instead the Security Council
requested that the General Assembly do so through the regular budget

140. Article 1 of the Statute of the International Tribunal. The Statute is set out as an annex
to Report of the Secretary-General,supra note 138, and is reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter

Statute].
141. Id. art 2.
142. Id. art. 3.
143. Id. art. 4.

144. Id. art. 5.
145. See G.A. Res. 40132, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/32 (1985), endorsing
the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the Seventh Crime
Congress, Milan (26 Aug.-6 Sept. 1985); DRaFlT PRINCIPLES ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE
JUDICIARY AND ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 5 NouvELLES ]TUDES
P9NALEs (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982). Fifty-four national constitutions provide for an independent judiciary, and an additional 32 explicitly require that criminal trials be conducted by an
independent and impartial tribunal. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of
CriminalJustice: Identiying InternationalProceduralProtections and Equivalent Protectionsin National
Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 271 & nn.170-71 (1993).
146. See Statute, supra note 140, arts. 16, 19, 20.
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of that body. Since the Security Council established the Tribunal pursuant to its Chapter VII powers, this was an odd and unnecessary
choice, and it has impeded the work of the Tribunal. If the Security
Council had funded the Tribunal through its peacekeeping budget, the
Tribunal would not have needed to go through the various stages of
the General Assembly's budget procedures. At that time the General
Assembly's budget was severely reduced, and as a result the Tribunal
has been inadequately funded since its inception. The exercise of administrative and financial control over the Tribunal by U.N. headquarters' personnel subordinates important decisions concerning personnel,
travel'; and witness protection to New York. These arrangements hamper, delay, and frustrate the work of the Tribunal, particularly the
investigatory and prosecutorial efforts.
Not all of the Security Council's Permanent Members supported the
initiative for a Tribunal, which was seen as potentially disruptive of
negotiations for a political settlement of the conflict. Some Security
Council members, as well as other Member States, felt that such a
judicial organ should be established by the General Assembly or by a
multilateral treaty. Other members urged that this was an opportunity
to establish a permanent international criminal court, but the political
advantages of controlling ad hoc institutions by the Security Council
prevailed.
The year long delay in the appointment of Richard Goldstone as
Prosecutor is further evidence of the politicization of the Tribunal. 147
Although Resolution 827 'provided for the continuation of the work
of the Commission of Experts until the appointment of the Prosecutor,148 the Commission of Experts was prematurely terminated as of
April 30, 1994 by administrative fiat, while the Prosecutor was not
appointed until July 15, 1994. Although this bureaucratic lag might
have severed the institutional links between the Commission of Experts
and the Prosecutor, requiring the Prosecutor to begin his investigations
ab initio and delaying the issuing of any indictments, the Commission
Chair and Prosecutor Goldstone established a direct personal link."1 9
147. See BASSIOuNI, YUGOSLAVIA TRIBUNAL, supra note 52, at 210-12
148. Resolution 827, supra note 133, para. 10.
149. See Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Scrious
Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since
1991, U.N. GAOR/SCOR, 49th Sess., at paras. 157-58, U.N. Doc. A/491432, 5/199411007

(1994):
157. Not long after the establishment of the Tribunal, the judges had the opportu-

nity to meet with Mr. Cherif Bassiouni, Chairman of the Commission of Experts
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992). On 25 February 1994,
the Acting Deputy Prosecutor and other staff members of the Tribunal met in The

Hague with Mr. Bassiouni and other members of the Commission. The work and
findings of the Commission were discussed at length and certain materials were handed
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The Prosecutor was able to indict twenty-two persons within months
of taking office. Notwithstanding the difficulties faced by the Prosecutor's office, as of September 15, 1996, seventy-five persons have been
indicted, one is being prosecuted, one plead guilty, and seven are being
held in custody.
The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) and the Republica Srpska, the Bosnian Serb de facto
government, have refused to recognize the competence of the Tribunal
and have not cooperated with respect to the investigation and surrender
of indicted persons. 150 This lack of cooperation has clearly hampered
151
the ability of the ICTFY to bring indicted war criminals to trial.
over to the office of the Prosecutor. Subsequently, the Acting Deputy Prosecutor visited
the Commission's premises in Geneva. A staff member also visited Chicago to inspect
and receive instruction on the Commission's computer database. The Acting Deputy
Prosecutor also had meetings with most of the Commission's commissioners and staff
members.
158. During April 1994, the Office of the Prosecutor obtained a copy of the
Commission's database. Subsequently, in May 1994, all of the documents from Chicago,
which form the basis of the information in the database, were received by the Tribunal.
By the end of May 1994, action had commenced to scan those documents onto the
Prosecutor's own computer system .... The Office of the Prosecutor has enjoyed a
close working relationship with the Commission of Experts.
See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International HumanitarianLaw in the Former Yugoslavia 5
CRni. L.E 279 (1994).
150. The Deputy Prime Minister and Federal Minister of Justice of the FRY, Professor
Stojanovic, expressed the position of the FRY as follows:
The federal government is prepared to make it possible for one representative of the
International Criminal Tribunal, andlor the prosecutor of the tribunal to be present
within the framework of the United Nations Protection Force in Belgrade, without
having the right to specifically display the title of the International Criminal Tribunal
and/or the prosecutor of the tribunal. This representative would be enabled contacts witb
responsible federal and republican bodies and non-governmental organizations, on the understanding that he would be in no position to undertake investigative action visa vis domestic
physical person.
LAWYERs COMMITTEE FOR HuNAN RIGHTS, THE INTERNATIONAL CIMuNAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: ESTABLISHMENT, ORGANIZATION, JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS TO

DATE 9 (1995) (citing Letter dated December 20, 1994 from the Deputy Prime Minister and Federal

Minister ofJestice of the FR of Yugoslavia addressed to the Prosecutorof the Tribunal, U.N. GAORISCOR,
49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/50156, S1199411450 (1994) (emphasis added). The FRY also reiterated
its view that a permanent international tribunal should be established to prosecute war criminals.
By implication, the FRY took the position that in the absence of a permanent international
tribunal, the FRY would undertake national prosecutions under Chapter XVI of the Criminal
Code of the FRY. The letter concludes that the FRY "seriously calls into question assurances of

the tribunal's impartiality, which may adversely affect future cooperation" due to the fact that
the first indictments were against Serbians. The letter does not augur well for prospects of
recognition of the Tribunal's jurisdiction, its supremacy over national prosecutions under Article
9 of the Statute, or acceptance of deferral of investigations and prosecutions before national
authorities.
151. Still, the Prosecutor's office perseveres. See the judgement of Trial Chamber 1 in the case
of Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, of July 11, 1996. These proceedings were
pursuant to Rule 61 of the ICTFY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence to confirm the earlier
indictments of these two accused persons. Case No. IT-95-5-R61 and Case No. IT-95-18-R61.
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The future of the ICTFY is dependant upon the Security Council's
determination that it is needed to maintain peace. 152 Although the
Tribunal was established by the Security Council pursuant to its powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security
Council has not used its sanction powers to enforce the orders of the
Tribunal with respect to any defendant, nor has it taken any action
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the authorities of the
so-called Republica Srpska. Nor, after the Dayton Accords of 1995,
will NATO forces, IFOR, apprehend indicted war criminals. Once
again the pursuit of a political settlement prevails over justice.
N. The Rwanda Commission of Experts
In July 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 935 establishing a commission of experts to investigate grave violations of
international humanitarian law committed during the Rwandan civil
war, including possible acts of genocide, and report its findings to the
Secretary-General. 153 The Rwandan Commission lasted only four months
which was not long enough for the Commission to effectively fulfill
its investigatory mandate.
The Security Council made sure that the Rwanda Commission would
not embark on the same path taken by the Commission of Experts for
Yugoslavia. The Rwanda Commission was given a limited mandate,
three months to carry it out, and no means to investigate any specific
allegations. The three-man Commission spent a total of one week in
the field, and conducted no investigations. Its report was patterned on
the Final Report of the Commission of Experts for the Former Yugoslavia, but necessarily lacked the thoroughness of the latter. The Rwanda
Commission Report was based on reports made by other bodies, and
other media and published reports. On October 4, 1994, the Rwandan
Commission submitted its preliminary report 5 4 to the Secretary-General, and on December 9, 1994 its final report. 151 These reports laid
the groundwork for the Security Council to establish an ad hoc tribunal
for Rwanda.
0. The InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor Rwanda (ICTR)
The Statute and the judicial mechanism for the Rwandan Tribunal
were adopted in Security Council Resolution 955.156 The article of the
152. BASSIOUNI, YUGOSLAVIA TRIBUNAL, supra note 52, at 244-51.
153. S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. SIRESI935 (1994).
154. See Letter Dated 1 October 1994 from the Secretary-GeneralAddressed to the Prsident of the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/199411125 (1994).
155. Letter Dated9 December 1994from the Secretary-GeneralAddressed to the Prsiekntofthe Sccurity
Council, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (1994).

156. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter
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Statute regarding individual criminal responsibility mirrors its counterpart article in the Statute for the ICTFY.157 In fact, the "statute of
the Rwanda tribunal . . .was an adaptation of the statute of the
Yugoslav Tribunal to the circumstances of Rwanda ....-158 The Rwandan Tribunal has temporal jurisdiction from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 1994.159 Like the ICTFY, the ICTR can prosecute for
genocide 160 and "crimes against humanity.' 161 Because the conflict in
Rwanda was a civil war, violations of the laws and customs of war and
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 covering international conflicts will
not be prosecuted. 162 Rather, violations of Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of Additional Protocol 2 will be
prosecuted. 163
Even though the statutes for the ICTR and the ICTFY differ, the
tribunals share a common Prosecutor and a common Appellate Chamber. This is a curious formula for two separate ad hoc tribunals established separately by the Security Council through two unrelated resolutions. According to the Secretary-General, however, the "institutional
links . . . ensure a unity of legal approach, as well as economy and
efficiency of resources."'1 The decision to link the two bodies was not,

Rwanda Statute]. See Larry Johnson, The InternationalTribunalfor Rwanda, 67 REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PANAL 211 (1996); Payam Akhavan, The InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor
Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501 (1996).
157. Compare Resolution 955, art. 6, supra note 156 to the Statute for the ICTFY, art. 7,
supra note 140.
158. Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Paragraph5 of Security Council Resolution 955
(1994), U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., at para. 9, U.N. Doc. S11995/134 (1995). See also Johnson, supra
note 156.
159. Rwanda Statute, supra note 156, art. 7.
160. Id. art. 2.
161. Id. art. 3. The Rwanda Statute's definition of that crime differs somewhat from that of
the ICTFY. See BASSIOUNI, YuGOsLAviA TRIBUNAL, supra note 52, at 491; Akhavan, supra note
156, at 503.
162. SeeBAssIOUNI, YuGOsLAVIA TIBUNAL, supra note 52; Akhavan, supra note 156, at 504.
163. Rwanda Statute, supra note 156, art. 4. Akhavan states:
The most significant difference between the two Statutes relates to Article 4 of the
Rwanda Statute, which includes violations of Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and of the 1977 Additional Protocol II within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal . .. T]he Secretary-General had excluded common Article 3
and Additional Protocols I and II from the Yugoslav Statute on the grounds that they
were not "rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond doubt part of the
customary law." ... The Report of the Secretary-General on the Rwanda Statute notes
that the Security Council "has elected to take a more expansive approach to the choice
of the applicable law than the one underlying the statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal.
Furthermore, . . . the Report suggests that the Council has thereby included within
the subject matter jurisdiction of the Rwanda Tribunal "international instruments
regardless of whether they were considered part of customary international law or
whether they have customarily entailed the individual criminal responsibility of the
perpetrator of the crime."
Akhavan, supra note 156, at 503-04 (citations omitted).
164. Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Paragraph5 of Security Council Resolution 935
(1994), supra note 158, para. 9.
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however, based on any valid legal argument. The United States, which
pushed for this formula, wanted to avoid delays in selecting the Prosecutor as was the case with the ICTFY The rationale for sharing the
ICTFY Appellate Chamber was based entirely on a cost-saving consideration. The choice of a single Prosecutor was particularly ill-advised
because no person, no matter how talented, can oversee two major sets
of prosecutions separated by 10,000 miles. The idea that one can
shuttle between The Hague, Netherlands and Arusha, Tanzania as part
of a normal work schedule is nothing short of absurd. Sharing a single
Appellate Chamber also poses two problems, though of a more benign
legal nature. First, the substantive law applicable to the two Tribunals
is different. That means that in an eventual interpretation of "crimes
against humanity" under both Statutes, the Appellate Chamber must
necessarily be inconsistent. Second, while the ICTFY judges rotate in
the Appellate Chamber, the ICTR judges do not. One of the two
Tribunals was destined to suffer and in time it became clear that the
ICTR did. 165
The ICTR, like the ICTFY, is under the administrative and financial
control of the United Nations. Only as of September 1996 did it
become fully operational because of logistical, administrative, and financial
problems. Yet, the Rwandan Government is holding 75,000 persons
in custody, pending trial either before the ICTR or eventually, before
its own tribunals. Thus, unlike the ICTFY which is fully operational
but cannot apprehend those who are indicted, the ICTR has not been
able to prosecute those held in custody. Unlike the ICTFY which is
unlikely under prevailing political circumstances to prosecute anyone
who could upset the delicately balanced political settlement achieved
so far, the ICTR could accomplish a great deal. To date, however, it
has been regrettably treated with neglect.
Because of the total devastation wrought by the Rwandan civil war,
the Security Council was compelled to deal with many political, logistical, and practical problems in the establishment of the ICTR. The
Security Council had to negotiate with the new government on the
establishment of the Tribunal at a time when Rwanda was also a
member of the Security Council. This situation complicated the Council's task, particularly because the views of that government and its
expectations of an international tribunal differed from those of the rest
of the Council. For instance, while the Government of Rwanda wanted
165. See Financing of the International CriminalTribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory
of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other such Violations Committed in the
Territory ofNeighboring States Between 1 Januaryand3 December 1994, Report of the Secretary-Gencral
on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, Note by the Secretary Gencral, U.N. GAOR,
51st Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A151/789 (1997).
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the new Tribunal to be able to impose the death penalty, the Council
was opposed to it, because it had already decided against that penalty
in connection with the ICTFY In addition, the U.N. had some difficulty
convincing the Rwandan Government to agree that the Tribunal would
also prosecute Tutsi violations against Hutu victims. Finally, the U.N.'s
Legal Counsel, Hans Correll, had to conduct extensive negotiations
with the new Rwandan Government regarding the site of the Tribunal.
Because of the absence of an effective infrastructure, and because the
U.N. feared that a Tribunal in Kigali would be under the influence of
the Rwandan Government which, after all, represented the victorious
Tutsi who were the victims of Hutu crimes, the Tribunal was located
in Arusha, Tanzania.
Establishing the Tribunal in another country was unprecedented,
and required a U.N. host country agreement with Tanzania, which
took some time to conclude. Because most defendants and witnesses
would have to come from Rwanda, this is an enterprise fraught with
logistical problems and practical difficulties. Moreover, Arusha is not
the ideal place for locating the Tribunal, since there too, the U.N. had
to build the Tribunal's infrastructure from scratch under trying conditions.
These difficulties demonstrate the fundamental inability of the Security Council to micro-manage action-oriented bodies that require
constant attention to details. This experience led to what David Scheffer, Senior Counsel to U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeline Albright, called the Council's "Tribunal fatigue."
Ultimately, despite certain promising conditions, the logistical problems and administrative inefficiency of the ICTR make it unlikely that
its prosecutions will become a landmark precedent. Moreover, its failures may prevent the Security Council from engaging in similar ad hoc
endeavors in the future, thus rendering a permanent international
criminal court even more necessary.

II. THE UNITED NATIONS' EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND TO CODIFY
CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
Between 1946 and 1996, the United Nations' efforts to codify
certain international crimes and to establish an international criminal
court have been carefully separated, though always intertwined. Though
the Cold War hindered the codification process, progress has occurred
since 1990.16
166. The Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
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During the first session of the General Assembly in 1946, the
United States sponsored Resolution 95(I) which affirmed "the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and the judgment of the [IMT] Tribunal.' 1 67 In 1947, the
General Assembly directed the Committee on the Codification of International Law, the International law Commission's [ILC] predecessor,168 to formulate a general codification of offenses against the peace
and security of mankind.169 The Resolution mandated the ILC to:
(a) formulate the principles of international law recognized
in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, and
(b) prepare a draft code of offenses against the peace and
security of mankind, indicating clearly the place to be accorded 0to the principles mentioned in sub-paragraph (a)
17
above.
Two years later, in compliance with the Resolution, the ILC started
to "[formulate] the principles recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal" and to "[prepare] a draft code of the offenses against
the peace and security of mankind." 171 A subcommittee was formed
and a special rapporteur was appointed to prepare a Draft Code of
recommended in its Report to the General Assembly that a diplomatic Conference be convened
in 1998. See Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 52.
Note that the work of the International Association of Penal Law (AIDP) on the establishment
of a permanent international criminal court and on the codification of international criminal law
has been consistent since 1924. See Vespasian V. Pella, Towards an InternationalCriminalCourt, 44
AM. J. INTL L 37 (1950); 17 REVuE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PANAL, Nos. 3-4 (1936); 19
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PANAL, No. 1 (1948); 20 REVUE INTERNATIONALE D13
DROIT PLNAL, No. 1 (1949); 45 REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PINAL, Nos. 3-4 (1974);
Draft StatuteInternationalCriminalTribunal, 9 NouvELass 12rUDES P1NALES (M. Cherif Bassiouni
ed., 1992), translated into French and Spanish in 10 NoUVELLES 1rTUDES P NALES (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 1993); Commentaries on the InternationalLaw Commission's 1991 Draft Code of Crimas
Against the Peace an Security of Mankind, 11 NouvELLEs ]TUDFS P NALES (14. Cherif Bassiouni
ed., 1993); M. CHEPaF BAssioUNi, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL Law: A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL CODE (1980); 52 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT P NAL (1981), revised andupdated
in M. CHERiF BASsIoUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND STATUTE FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (1987).
167. G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946) [hereinafter
Resolution 95]. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Histoly of the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace
and Security of Mankind, 27 IsRAEL L. REV. 247 (1993); Leo Gross, Some Observations on the Draft
Code of Offenses Against the Peace andSecurity of Mankind, 13 ISRAEL YB. HUM. RTs. 9, 10 (1983);
Sharon Williams, The Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace andSecurity of Mankind, in BASSiOUNI,
ICL, supra note 12, at 109.

168. G.A. Res. 174, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., at 105-10, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947) [hereinaftcr
Resolution 174].

169. G.A. Res. 177, U.N GAOR, 2d Sess., at 9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/4 (1947).
170. Idi See also Gross, supra note 167, at 10.
171. 1 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION vi (1949), referring to Resolution 174, supra note 168 and Resolution 95, supra note 167.
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Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.172 That title was
changed in 1988 to Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
173
Security of Mankind.
Concurrently, the task of formulating a Draft Statute for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court was assigned to another
who submitted his first report to the ILC in March
special rapporteur,
1950.174 That report argued that a substantive criminal code and a
statute for an international criminal court should complement one
another. 175 Contrary to logic and rational drafting policy, these two
codification projects remained separated. 176 In 1950, another rapporteur
was appointed to study the further development of an international
on whether the time
criminal court.177 The two rapporteurs differed
178
was ripe for an international criminal court.

172. The first report was completed in 1950. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N.
GAOR, 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/25 (1950).
173. See Report ofte InternationalLaw Commission, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at
145, U.N. Doc. A/43/10 (1988). The Draft Code of Offenses, subsequently the Draft Code of
Crimes, was never intended to codify all international crimes. The number of crimes included
within the code has fluctuated from a current high of twenty-five to a low of five. As of 1996,
the categories of international crimes are: aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, crimes against United Nations and associated personnel, unlawful possession of, use or
emplacement of weapons, theft of nuclear materials, mercenarism, apartheid, slavery and slave
related practices, torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, unlawful human experimentation, piracy, aircraft hijacking and unlawful acts against
international air safety, unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation and the safety of
platforms on the high seas, threat and use of force against internationally protected persons, taking
of civilian hostages, unlawful use of the mail, unlawful traffic in drugs and related drug offenses,
destruction and/or theft of national treasures, unlawful acts against certain internationally protected elements of the environment, internatiohal traffic in obscene publications, falsification and
counterfeiting, unlawful interference with international submarine cables, and bribery of foreign

public officials. The three crimes most-recently included are: crimes against United Nations and
associated personnel, mercenarism, and unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation
and the safety of platforms on the high seas. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES:
DIGEST/INDEX OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 1815-1985 (2 vols., 1985) [hereinafter BASslouNI, DIGFST/INDEX]
174. Report of the International Law Commission on Question of International CriminalJurisdiction,
U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/15 (1950).

175. Id. See also Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No.
12, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), and discussions on this report by the Sixth Committee of the
General Assembly, reprinted in 2 BENJAMIN FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
265-305 (2 vols., 1980) [hereinafter FERENCZ].
176. That situation continued in part because of political considerations, and later, in part
because the ILC's 1991 Draft Code of Crimes was not well received. Commentaries on the International Law Commission's 1991 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 11
NoUVF.LLES ATUS PfNALES (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1993) [hereinafter Commentaries on 1991

Draft Code].
177. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., U.N. AJCN.4120
(1950).
178. Id; Report of the Sixth Committee to the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/1639 (1950), reprintedin FERENCZ, supra note 175, at 306-11.
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While many countries, such as the United Kingdom, believed the
establishment of an international criminal court was desirable in theory, its establishment was doomed by the absence of consensus among
the world's major powers.17 9 The Soviet Union believed its sovereignty
would be affected by the establishment of such a tribunal. 18 0 The
United States was also not prepared to accept the establishment of such
a court at the height of the Cold War. France, in 1950, was the only
permanent member of the Security Council willing to support the
establishment of an international criminal court. 18 l
A Special Committee of the General Assembly was established in
1951, composed of representatives of seventeen states, for the purpose
of drafting a convention for the establishment of an international
criminal court. 182 The substantive legal aspects of codification were
given to one drafting body and the enforcement counterpart to another
body.
In 1951, the Special Committee appointed to draft the statute for
the formulation of an International Criminal Court finished its task,
modeling the statute in part after that of the International Court of
Justice. 183 The discussions and written comments, particularly those of
major powers clearly, indicated that the project had no chance of
acceptance and was politically premature. 184 Because these states did

179. Id. at 26-31.
180. Id.
181. Id Currently, while no state openly opposes the establishment of such a court, some
extend the debate as a way of delaying the drafting of a statute. If, despite these tactics, a
compromise statute is adopted, it is likely that it will contain certain provisions that will reduce
its effectiveness. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishmentof an InternationalCriminalCourt,
U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doc. A/50122 (1995). The writing is already on
the wall with insistence by some states on "complementarity." See Report of the Ad Hc Committee
on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminal Court, supra, at 6-7. The proposals that came out
of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee on "international cooperation," in effect
would require the ICC to be subject to national laws and procedures on surrender of accused,
and legal assistance to obtain evidence. See Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 52.
182. See Report of the Sixth Committee, reprintedin FEREnNCZ, supra note 175, at 298-305; Rport
of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminal Court, supra note 181; M.
Cherif Bassiouni, Recent United Nations Activities in Connection Wih the Establishment of a Permanent
InternationalCriminalCourt and the Role of the Association Internationalede DroitPtnaland the Instituto
Superiore Internazionaledi Scienze Criminali, 67 REvUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT P6INALE 127
(1996).
183. Report of the Committee on International CriminalCourtJurisdiction,U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess.,
Supp. No. 11, at 21-25, U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952) [hereinafter 1951 Draft Statute]. See also
Comments Received from Governments Regarding the Report of the Committee on International Criminal
Jurisdiction,U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., U.N. Doc. A2186 and U.N. Doc. A/2186/Add.1. Sce also
HistoricalSurvey of the Question of International CriminalJurisdiction, Memorandum b) the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7/Rev. 1 (1949), reprintedin FERENCZ, supra
note 175, at 399.
184. See Report of the Sixth Committee, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., U.N. Doc. A12275 (1952) and
discussions on this report by the Sixth Committee, reprinted in FEr'ENCZ, supra note 175, at
424-28.

1997 / InternationalCriminal Court
not want to assume political responsibility for the demise of a permanent international criminal court within only five and six years, respectively, of the IMTFE and IMT's judgments, 185 the Committee, with
some membership changes, revised the 1951 Draft Statute and finalized revisions in 1953.186
The 1953 revised Draft Statute was submitted to the General Assembly, which found it necessary to first consider the JiC's work on
the Draft Code of Offenses. The statute for an international criminal
court was therefore tabled until the draft code of offenses was finalized. 187 The ILC's approved text of the Draft Code of Offenses, consisting of five articles and listing thirteen separate international crimes,
was submitted to the General Assembly in 1954.188
Article 2 of the 1954 Draft Code, the article dealing with aggression, did not define aggression, since another Special Committee had
been established to develop a definition. The General Assembly therefore postponed further consideration of the 1954 Draft Code until the
Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression submitted
its report. 18 9 Consequently, the expected domino effect occurred: the
1953 Draft Statute for an ICC could not be considered before the 1954
Draft Code of Offenses, and the 1954 Draft Code of Offenses, could
not be considered until aggression was defined. As a result, the 1953
Draft Statute and the 1954 Draft Code were tabled until aggression
was defined. 19°
The definition of aggression followed a long and arduous course. The
General Assembly appointed a first Special Committee on the Question
of Defining Aggression of fifteen members (1952-1954), then a second
Special Committee of nineteen members (1954-1957), and then a third

185. In 1952 the Allies were still holding trials in Germany under CCL 10, see supra text
accompanying notes 79-82, and in the Far East, see supra text accompanying notes 89-110.
186. Report oftthe Committee on InternationalCriminalJurisdiction,U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp.
No. 12, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954). The revised statute made a number of changes to the
1951 Draft Statute in order to encourage more states to accept such a proposal, mostly softening
the compulsory jurisdiction of the court by allowing more flexibility and voluntary participation
on the part of states, including the opportunity for states to withdraw from the court's jurisdiction
upon one year's notice. The Special Committee was eager to develop a project that was politically
acceptable to the major powers, but even so, the political climate was still not ripe.
187. G.A. Res. 898 (Mt), U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp No. 21, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/2890
(1954) [hereinafter Resolution 898 (IX)].
188. See Third Report Relating to a Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
U.N. GAOR, 6th Seas., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/85 (1954). See also D.H.N. Johnson, The Draft Code
of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 4 INr'L COMP. LQ. 445 (1955).
189. Resolution 898 (IX), supra note 187. See also Report oftthe 1953 Committee on International
CriminalJurisdiction,U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess. Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1957); G.A. Res.
1187 (XII), U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/3805 (1957), which
tabled the draft once again.
190. For a more derailed historical chronology and evolution, see Bassiouni, Gross, and
Williams, supra note 167.
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Special Committee of twenty-one members (1959-1967), and lastly a
fourth Special Committee of thirty-five members (1967-1974). 191 These
four committees submitted various reports which were debated and
discussed at length in committees and by the General Assembly. The
last of the special committees finally completed its task in 1974, and
the General Assembly adopted the definition of aggression by a consensus resolution. 92 It is noteworthy that the definition of aggression,
which took more than twenty years to define, was neither included in
a multilateral convention nor even voted upon in the resolution that
adopted it.

The General Assembly, having previously tabled further consideration of the 1954 Draft Code of Offenses on the ground that aggression
first had to be defined, and also having tabled consideration of the 1953
Draft Statute for an international criminal court because the 1954
Draft Code had not been adopted first, logically would have had to
reconsider these two items once aggression had been defined in 1974.
Nevertheless, the General Assembly did not see fit to reconsider the
question of the 1954 Draft Code of Offenses until 1978 nor did it elect
to reconsider the question of the 1953 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court. In 1982, a new rapporteur of the ILC produced
his first report on the draft code, 193 which contained a variety of
generalities concerning international criminal law, individual and state
responsibility, and observations on the eventual contents of such a
code. 194 The new Rapporteur was starting his work on the project ab
initio, and it took him until 1991 to produce what was intended to be
191. For a history and documents relating to these committees, see BENJAMIN FERENCZ,
DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION (1975).
192. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142-43, U.N. Doc.
A19631 (1974). For a comparison of the various committee reports and alternative drafts until
1971, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Definition of Aggression in InternationalLaw: The Crime Against
Peace, in 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 159 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P.
Nanda eds., 1973); M. Cherif Bassiouni & Benjamin Ferencz, The Crime Against Peace, in 1
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 167 (M. Cherif Bassiouni 1986).

193. See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-fifth sasion, U.N.
GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 11-28, U.N. Doc. A/38/10 (1983).
194. It should be noted that the new rapporteur, like his predecessors, confined criminal
responsibility to individuals, excluding organizations and states. But see FMUHAD MALEKIAN,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES (1985). The enunciation of the principles
of state responsibility have, however, have since 1976 contained the notion of state criminal
responsibility. See 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMrISSION, U.N. GAOR, 31st
Sess., U.N. Doc A/CN/SER.A/1976 (1976); Report of the International Law Commission, U.N.
GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A136/10 (1984). Commenting on this concept, seec
IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY 32-33 (1983);
YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COtMISSION, supra, at 26-54 (containing Special
Rapporteur Ago's approach); Virginia Morris & M. Christiane Boushoyannies-Vrailes, Current

Development: The Work of the Sixth Committee at the Fiftieth Session of the U.N. General Assembly, 90
Am. J. INT'L L. 491, 494 (1996).
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a final text. 195 Because the report was criticized by governments and
scholars 196 it was revised and adopted in 1996.197
The question of an international criminal court came back to the
ILC by an unexpected route. In 1989, the General Assembly requested
the ILC to prepare a report on an international criminal jurisdiction
for the prosecution of persons engaged in drug trafficking. 198 Contemporaneously, an NGO committee of experts, chaired by this author,
prepared another draft statute in June of 1990, and submitted it to
the Eighth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and the
Treatment of Offenders. 199 The Eighth Congress recognized the need

195. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess. Supp. No. 10, U.N.
Doc. A146110 (1991).
196. Commentaries on 1991 Draft Code, supra note 176.
197. Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind- Titles and Articles on the Draft
Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind adopted by the International Law Commission on
its forty-eight session, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CNA.4L532 (1996), revised by U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4L532/Corr. 1 and U.N. Doc. AJCN.4L.532/Corr.3.
198. G.A. Res. 43/164, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 280, U.N. Doc. A/43/49
(1988); G.A. Res. 44/39 U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp.No.49, at 310, U.N. Doc. A/44149
(1989). This recommendation was the consequence of a resolution adopted by the Special Session
of the General Assembly of that year on the question of illicit traffic in drugs. Its sponsor was
Trinidad and Tobago, whose former Prime Minister Arthur N.R. Robinson was the moving force
behind it. Robinson deserves much credit for his untiring efforts to promote an ICC.
In a separate development in 1979, the Commission of Human Rights, Ad Hoc Working
Group on Southern Africa, requested this author to prepare a draft statute for the establishment
of an international criminal jurisdiction to implement the Apartheid Convention. International
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068
(XXVIII), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) [hereinafter
Apartheid Convention]. The Apartheid Convention contains explicit language in Article 5 for
the creation of an international criminal jurisdiction. Id. at 75. Similarly, the Genocide Convention provides for the jurisdiction of an international criminal court for the crime of genocide,
should such a court be established. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
The draft statute for the creation of an international criminal jurisdiction to enforce the
Apartheid Convention was completed in 1980 and submitted to the Commission on Human
Rights, which accepted it without discussion and circulated it to the Member States for their
comments. Study on the tays and means of insuring the implementation of international instruments such as
the International Conention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, including the
establishment of the intesnational jurisdiction envisaged by the Convention, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., U.N.
Doc. EICN.4/1426 (1980). Seealso M. Cherif Bassiouni & Daniel H. Derby, Final Report on the
Establishment ofand International Criminal Court for the Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and
Other Relevant International Instruments, 9 HoFsTRA L Ray. 523 (1981). No further action was
taken.
199. Draft Statute: International Criminal Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
144/NGO.7 (1990), reprinted in 15 NOVA L. RE. 373 (1991). Seealso M. Cherif Bassiouni, A
Comprehensive Strategic Approach on International Cooperation for the Prevention, Control and Suppression
of International and Transnational Criminality, Including the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, 15 NOVA L. REv. 353 (1991). The committee of experts was assembled by the International
Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences (Siracusa, Italy), in cooperation with the United
Nation Crime Prevention Branch and the Italian Ministry of Justice.
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for an international criminal
court, and supported the ILC's continued
20 0
efforts on this matter.
The JIC discussed the nature of an international criminal tribunal,
its ratione materiae, the conferment of jurisdiction, and the institution
of criminal proceedings before the court, and decided to continue the
discussion on this question in later sessions along with its further
consideration of the 1991 Draft Code of Crimes. 20 1 Thus, the ILC did
link its work in the Draft Code of Crimes to that of an eventual draft
statute for an international criminal court, even though the General
Assembly had not given it such a mandate. But later, the ILC and the
General Assembly decoupled the two projects.
Although the ILC transcended the drug trafficking question which
was the basis of its original mandate, the General Assembly did not
raise any questions of scope. Wisely, the ILC started with a preliminary
report in 1992,202 and when that report was favorably received by the
General Assembly, the IC produced a comprehensive text in 1993,203
which it modified in 1994.204 The changes made in the ILC's 1994
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court were intended to
answer the political concerns of some of the world's major powers. 20 5
Nevertheless, both the ILC and the Sixth Committee of the General
Assembly decoupled the ILCs Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court from the Draft Code of Crimes, ostensibly because in 1994
the latter was not yet completed. In 1996, the ILC modified the Draft
Code of Crimes, 20 6 and took into account the experiences of the ICTFY
200. Report of the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 144/28 (1990).
201. Report ofthe InternationalLaw Commission, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 193,
U.N. Doc. A/46110 (1991).
202. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N.
Doc. A/47/10 (1992).
203. See Revised Report of the Working Group on the Draft Statute for an International Criminal
Court, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4IL.490 (1993); Revised Report of the Working
Group on the Draft Statute for an InternationalCriminalCourt: Addendum, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/CNA/L490/Add.1 (1993).
204. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N.
Doc. A/49/10 (1994). See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Establishing an International Criminal Court:
HistoricalSurvy, 149 MIL L. REV. 49 (1995); Timothy C. Evered, An InternationalCriminalCourt:
Recent Proposals andAmerican Concerns, 6 PACE INI'L L. REV. 121 (1994); Michael P. Scharf, Getting
Serious about an InternationalCriminal Court, 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 103 (1994). For an insightful
contribution to work on the subject by its Deputy Secretary, see Manuel Rama-Montaldo, Acarca
de Algunor Conceptos Basicos Relativos al derecho PenalInternacionaly a unaJurisdicionPenal Internacional, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN EVOLVING WoRm 865-93 (Manuel Rama-Montaldo, ed.,
1994).
205. James Crawford, The ILC Adopts a Statute for an International CriminalCourt, 89 Am. J.
INT'L L. 404 (1995). Professor Crawford, a distinguished member of the ILC, has contributed
significantly to the 1994 Draft Statute and also to the Draft Code of Crimes which was adopted
in 1996, infra note 206.
206. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peaceand Security of Mankind Titles and Texts of Artides on
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and the ICTR, as well as the debates of the Ad Hoc Committee and
the Prepatory Committee on the International Criminal Court.
The JIG's perseverance and ingenuity in developing the limited
1989 mandate related to illicit drug trafficking into what became the
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court merits high praise.
The 1994 Draft Statute was the basis upon which the General Assembly in 1994 established the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, 20 7 and then in 1995 the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court.2 0 8 The Preparatory Committee's Report was submitted to the
General Assembly's 51st session on October 28, 1996, with a recommendation that the General Assembly extend the Preparatory Committee's term with a specific mandate to negotiate proposals with a
view to producing a consolidated text of a Convention, Statute, and
annexed instruments by 1998.209 This schedule is a setback for those
who had hoped for a 1997 Plenipotentiary Conference.2 10 A number of
major powers are, however, reluctant to move faster and hope to defer
the diplomatic conference to a later time.
Still, one consideration may prove to be the impetus for the setting
up of a permanent court by 1998. The ICTFY and ICTR are established by the Security Council pursuant to its powers under Chapter
VII of the Charter. By 1997 or 1998 the Security Council's ability to
keep these ad hoc tribunals in operation may prove difficult.2 1 1 Since
it would not be politically wise to simply abolish these tribunals, or
cause them to die on the vine, a permanent court that could take over
the remaining or prospective prosecutions would prove a most useful
212
solution.

the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind Adopted by the Intermtional Law
Commission at its forty-eight session, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc A/CN.4fL532 (1996).

207. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminalCourt, U.N.
GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doc A/50/22 (hereinafter Report of the Ad Hoc Committee].
208. G.A. Res. 50/46, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc A1RES/50/46 (1995). See also
Summary of the Proceedingsof the PreparatoryCommittee on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminal
Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doc A/50/22 (1995).
209. PreparatoryCommittee Report, supra note 52.
210. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Recent United Nations Activities in Connection With the Establishment of
a Permanent InternationalCriminal Court and the Role of the Association internationalede droit penal
and the Instituto SuperioreInternazionaledi Scienze Criminali,67 REvUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
P9NAL 127 (1996).

211. See supra text accppompanying notes 145-149.
212. For a useftul comparison of the statutes see Christopher L. Blakesley, Comparing the Ad
Hoc Tribunal for Crimes against Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia and the Projectfor an
InternationalCriminal Court, 67 REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT Pi NAi 139 (1996).
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CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR A PERMANENT SYSTEM OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Invariably after each war in which violations of international humanitarian law occur and prosecutions ensue, a hue and cry develops
in the defeated nations for the release of their citizens who were
convicted of such crimes. As political pressure increases, the prosecutions are viewed as contrary to peace, and the crimes committed are
overlooked.2 13 But few think of the past's victims, or of the effect of a
policy of impunity on the future. Only after the present political
culture realizes that justice is an indispensable component of peace will
the establishment of a permanent international criminal justice system
be possible.
Following the Treaty of Versailles, the German people began to
resist prosecutions. The President of the German Peace Delegation in
Paris, Baron von Larsner, reported to the Allies that
the entire German V6lk, without regard to class and party,
[was] of the conviction that it [was] impossible to deliver up
the so-called war criminals... no German official would lend
a hand to the arrest of a German in order to deliver him up
to the justice of the Entente [the Allies] . . . . The mere
proposal of an order of this kind would create such a storm
of indignation that the entire peace structure would be gravely
2 14
threatened.
The Allies' avowed intentions to establish prosecutions stipulated in
the Treaty of Versailles were, thus for political reasons, never realized.
Instead, some token prosecutions were held at Leipzig.
The process of tampering, limiting, or curtailing justice after World
War H was also evident when the recommendation of the 1919 Commission for the prosecution of Turkish Officials was set aside after the
United States and Japan strongly opposed it. The Treaty of Sevres
which had provided the Allies the right to prosecute Turkish officials
was then never ratified. Instead, the Treaty of Lausanne provided for
an amnesty in an unpublicized additional Protocol.
Then, after World War II, the policies of clemency in the Far East
and in Germany are also illustrative. Within a few short years of the
IMTFE's judgments, all convicted persons were released. The Em213. Occasionally the opposite occurs. See The Case of General Yamashita, supra notes 113,
116-119 and corresponding text.
214. VON LARSNER, 1 DIE AUSLIEFERUNG DER DEUTSCHEN KRIEGSVERBRESHER IN ZEHN
JAREN SEIT VERSAILLES 22 (H. Schnel & H. Draeger eds., 1929) (emphasis added), aho ctcd in
Remigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definition, in 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAw 559 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973).
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peror's 1946 amnesty edict and the 1951 Peace Treaty paved the way
for the early release of all those convicted in Allies' military proceedings. General MacArthur was content with the symbolic post-war
prosecutions but beyond that, his interest, as well as that of the U.S.
Government, was to strengthen peace through a stable Japan. In Germany, the IMT's sentences were upheld, with the exception of some
early releases on parole and commutation of sentences. Convictions
under CCL 10, however, were commuted and parole was used more
liberally.215 In the Western zones of occupation, the Allies were eager
to help Germany rebuild politically and economically. 216 Germany was
by then clearly in the Western camp, which needed it to face the strong
and defiant Eastern bloc.
In Italy, the Allies, in violation of the Articles of Surrender of 1945,
simply did not prosecute or extradite any of the alleged war criminals
to those states which requested them. Subsequently, Italy also refused
to extradite any accused war criminals, including those whose "dossiers" had been carefilly prepared by the UNWCC.
By 1992, bureaucratic hurdles, lack of resources, non-disclosure of
evidence, and other more subtle means were used to avoid prosecutions.
Thus, the Commission of Experts on the former Yugoslavia was not
funded for investigations, and when it accumulated evidence perceived
as dangerous to the political peace process, it was arbitrarily terminated. The ICTFY, notwithstanding all its public visibility, has only
prosecuted one low-ranking Bosnian Serb violator, 217 and convicted one
accused who pled guilty, but is unable to obtain jurisdiction over
seventy-five indicted persons, including major offenders, which IFOR
refuses to apprehend. The 1994 Rwanda Commission was not given a
long enough mandate nor adequate resources to do any investigation,
while the Rwanda Tribunal only commenced prosecution in 1997 of
one person due to bureaucratic and financial difficulties.
These past experiences with ad hoc international tribunals confirm
218
the need for a permanent system of international criminal justice.
215. See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON
THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL No. 10 (1949); FRANK M.
BUSCHER, THE U.S. WAR CRIES TRIAL PROGRAM IN GERMANY 1946-1955 (1989).
216. No industrialists were prosecuted at the MT. See EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE TRIAL OF
THE GERMANs (1969). Some industrialists were prosecuted in the United States. Subsequent
Proceedings in The Krupp Case, The Flick Case, and the L.G. Farben Case. None of the Industrialists
served more than five years. Almost all returned to their firms' ownership in whole or in part.
See APPLEMAN, supra note 44, at 171-220. For the terrible suffering of those who worked in these
industries as slave-labor, see BENJAMIN FERENCZ, LESS THAN SLAvEs (1979).

217. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/kla "Dule," Case No. IT-94-1-AR 72 (2 October 1995).
Opinion of the Appellate Chamber reprintedin Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
onJurisdiction, 7 CRIm. L. FOR. 51 (1996).
218. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher Blakesley, The Need for an International
Criminal Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 151 (1992).
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Because they only try certain offenders in certain conflicts, these tribunals and their laws and penalties raise fundamental questions about
compliance with the principles of legality and about general considerations of fairness. After WWII many felt that the Allies were applying one law to themselves and another to the defeated. Prosecutions
in Germany and in the Far East were labelled victors' vengeance.
Indeed, the Roman Law maxim, quod licet jovi non licet bovi,2 19 was not
heeded in either context. 220 Furthermore, ad hoc tribunals generally do
not provide equal treatment to individuals in similar circumstances
who commit similar violations. Thus, such tribunals create the appearance of uneven or unfair justice, even when the accused are properly
deserving of prosecution. A permanent system of international criminal
justice based on a preexisting international criminal statute would
allow any person from any nation to be held accountable for violations.
Equal treatment for violators would be guaranteed.
History also shows that investigative bodies should be institutionally linked to the prosecutorial organ of the tribunal that will adjudicate the cases. After World War I, for example, the work of the 1919
investigative commission was virtually nullified because the prosecutions were shifted from the international to the national level. Political
considerations, namely the U.S. refusal to relinquish control over IMT
proceedings, reduced the 1943 UNWCC to a collector and clearinghouse of information, rather than an investigative body. If a permanent
international system of criminal justice is established, then an international investigative body would be out of the control of any single
country. In addition, since an investigative body would logically be
linked to the adjudicative body, its work could not be dismissed,
overlooked, or relegated to a secondary role as were the 1919 Commission and the 1943 UNWCC.
There are also several practical reasons for advocating a permanent
system of international criminal justice. 221 A permanent system would
eliminate the necessity of establishing ad hoc tribunals every time the
need arises. The decision to establish such tribunals, not to mention
drafting the applicable statutes, takes considerable time during which
the evidence of the crimes becomes more difficult to obtain, and the
political will to prosecute dissipates. Moreover, a political debate is
invariably reopened over the provisions of the statute, who will conduct

219. What is lawful for victors is not unlawful for vanquished.

220. The defense of "obedience to superior orders" was rejected, as was that of tu quoque. Sce
K. WOm-ZEL, THE NUREMBERG Thum 120-21 (1962); ARTHUR VON KNIEREM, supra
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the prosecutions, and who will sit in judgment. Such pressures leave
ad hoc tribunals vulnerable to political manipulation.
The work of the ILC from 1947 to 1996 has been painstakingly
slow, facing constant political hurdles. In 1995, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, and in
1996 the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court made some progress. But now hard political
decisions must be made. World public opinion favors the establishment
of an effective and fair system of international criminal justice. Governments cannot forever ignore public opinion if they are to retain their
political credibility.
Impunity must no longer be the reward of those who commit the
222
most egregious international crimes and violations of human rights.
In addition to the many never prosecuted in the ad hoc tribunals
established following certain international conflicts, many more criminals in internal conflicts have not been brought to justice. The quantum of human harm produced since World War II by conflicts of a
non-international character-purely internal conflicts and victimization
by tyrannical regimes223 -far exceeds the combined casualty figures of
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DEATH BY GOVERNMENT (1994); Stephen P. Marks, Forgetting the Policies and Practicesof the Past:
Impumity in Cambodia, FLETcHER F., Summer/Fall 1994, at 18; Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth
and Nothing But the Truth: Truth Commissions, Impunity and the Inter-American Human Rights System,
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4/para.174 (1988), reprintedin 28 I.L.M. 291 (1989). Michael Reisman, Institutions and Practices
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223. "Tyrannical regimes" commit Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity. These are crimes
within the contemplated jurisdiction of the ICC. They are also international crimes ofjus cogens
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World War I and World War II. Yet, the overwhelming majority of
perpetrators have benefitted from impunity.
While an international justice system might not stop future conflicts,
it would vindicate the victims of international crimes and remind
ourselves and future generations of the victims' plight and the perpetrators misdeeds. To paraphrase the philosopher George Santayana, if
we do not record and learn the bitter lessons of the past we are
condemned to repeat our mistakes. That is why those who can, must
speak up. For to criticize the flawed legal and political processes which
unfolded in the past, is to serve justice as it ought to be in the future.

